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All useDrawing on interviewswith 194market participants (including 54 prac-
titioners of high-frequency trading or HFT), this article ﬁrst identiﬁes
the main classes of “signals” (patterns of data) that inﬂuence how
HFT algorithms buy and sell shares and interact with each other. Sec-
ond, it investigates historically the processes that have led to three of the
most important categories of these signals, ﬁnding that they arise from
three features of U.S. share trading that are the result of episodes of
meso-level conﬂict. Third, the article demonstrates the contingency of
these features by brieﬂy comparingHFT in share trading to HFT in fu-
tures, Treasurys, and foreign exchange.The article thus argues that how
HFT algorithms act and interact is a speciﬁc, contingent product not
just of the current but also of the past interaction of people, organiza-
tions, algorithms, and machines.INTRODUCTION
Until the mid-1990s, almost all U.S. share trading required direct human
involvement, usually via telephone calls or on crowded trading ﬂoors.
Now, it mostly takes place in ﬁve large computer data centers inNew Jersey
(see ﬁg. 1), each almost devoid of human beings and packed instead with
tens of thousands of servers interconnected by a vast spider’s web of cablesextremely grateful for the ﬁnancial support of the U.K. Economic and Social Re-
Council (ES/R003173/1) andEuropeanResearchCouncil (grant 291733,Evaluation
es in Financial Markets). I also owe a huge debt of gratitude to my interviewees,
e Lerner, and Jean Whitmore. Taylor Spears kindly produced the maps in ﬁgs. 1
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Alland switches. Massive volumes of messages—a million per second is rou-
tine—ﬂow through these webs, as well as among the ﬁve data centers via
ﬁber-optic cables and millimeter wave links.2 Lasers, originally designed
formilitary use, ﬂash signals (not usually visible from the ground) from data
center to data center across the skies of northern New Jersey. Transmission
times between data centers are now within a few millionths of a second of
what the theory of relativity posits as the fastest physically possible.
Much of the ﬂow of messages is the result of bids to buy shares or offers to
sell them (or cancellations of bids or offers), entered not by human beings
but by computer algorithms. Some of the latter—known as “execution algo-
rithms”—take a “parent” order from an institutional investor to buy or to
sell a large block of shares and break it up for less easily detectable executionFIG. 1.—The ﬁve main U.S. share trading data centers. NY4 and NY5 (in Secaucus)
andNJ2 (inWeehawken) host multiple trading venues; the NYSE andNasdaq data cen-
ters host the main computer systems of those exchanges.2 OnDecember 7, 2016, data vendor Exegy recorded a peak ﬂow of 10.6millionmessages
a second in one of the data centers, NY4. See https://www.marketdatapeaks.com/.
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Material Signalsinto multiple small “child” orders. Others are high-frequency trading or
HFT algorithms. HFT is proprietary trading (i.e., the pursuit of trading
proﬁts rather than earning fees for executing others’ orders) that is fully au-
tomated and ultrafast and usually involves very large numbers of individ-
ually small trades.
HFT ﬁrms are mostly highly specialized, and nearly all are recently es-
tablished and quite small; big banks are not prominent in HFT, especially
since the postcrisis curbs on their proprietary trading. Although publicly
available data do not reveal whether any given order is placed by a human
being or an algorithm,most observers agree that around half of all purchases
and sales of U.S. shares are made by HFT algorithms (see, e.g., Meyer,
Massoudi, and Stafford 2015), and a substantial further proportion, of which
there are no consensual estimates, is accounted for by other types of algo-
rithms. The direct interaction of human beings in U.S. share trading has thus
largely been replaced by what Knorr Cetina (2013) in a talk at the American
Sociological Association’s annualmeeting christened “the interaction order of
algorithms.”3
The research reported here had three overlapping aspects. First, I inter-
viewed 54 high-frequency traders, seeking as in-depth an understanding
of HFT practices as possible. Unsurprisingly, interviewees did not usually
disclose details of what they often call “secret sauce”—private, proprietary
knowledge—and I did not probe for those details. Nevertheless, many inter-
viewees were prepared to talk about commonHFT practices, and some de-
scribed their secret sauce in general terms. Among the topics explored in the
interviews was what practitioners of HFT call “signals”: patterns in the
data received by their algorithms that affect how those algorithms behave,
in particular, by prompting them to place an order to buy or to sell shares, or
to cancel an earlier order. (In this article, the term “algorithm” is used in the
way participants use it—to refer not just to a set of instructions sufﬁciently
precise that they can be encoded in a computer programbut also to that pro-
gram running on a physical computer system and having effects on other3 There is the beginnings of a sociological literature on HFT, albeit one that has not tack-
led this article’s focus: the signals employed by HFT algorithms. Perhaps closest to this
article’s concerns are the examinations of “spooﬁng” (see below) in Arnoldi (2016) and the
discussion in Borch (2016) of analyses of the May 2010 U.S. stock market “ﬂash crash”
that postulate “herd behavior” by algorithms. Other important contributions include
the studies by Borch, Hansen, and Lange (2015), who apply Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis
to the role of traders’ bodies inHFT, contrasting it with bodily rhythms on trading ﬂoors;
Borch and Lange (2016), who examine high-frequency traders’ subjectivity; and Seyfert
(2016), who discusses the different sense-making regimes via which unusual trading pat-
terns are interpreted by high-frequency traders, their critics, and market regulators. Also
of relevance, although not focused directly on HFT practices, are the discussions of
regulation in Lenglet (2011), Castelle et al. (2016), Coombs (2016), and Lenglet and
Mol (2016).
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Allsystems.) In the market focused on in this article (U.S. shares), the inter-
views reveal four classes of signals that are widely used byHFT algorithms,
along with two further classes that are in more restricted use and one class
that was of historical importance to the emergence of HFT but no longer
exists (see table 1).
Second, I investigated historically what brought these classes of signals
into being. While the fourth of the four main classes of signal involves pro-
cesses of a different kind that cannot be discussed for reasons of space,4 the
other three turned out all to involve speciﬁc features of how U.S. shares are
traded: ﬁrst, the differences between how futures on share indices are traded
and how shares themselves are traded; second, the creation of “order books”
of unexecuted orders, and the dissemination of those “books” to market par-
ticipants, both human and algorithmic; and third, the fragmentation of share
trading across multiple venues. Those three features are not the inevitable
products of automation, but the outcome of meso-level conﬂicts—the ﬁrst
and third with origins in the 1970s and the second in the 1990s—over where
and how U.S. shares (and futures) should be traded. This article’s subtitle,
“A Historical Sociology . . . ,” refers to its excavation of these conﬂicts.
Third, the research examined not just shares but also the trading of fu-
tures and Treasurys (U.S. federal government securities), which are mar-
kets in which HFT is a major presence, along with a number of other mar-
kets in which it has so far been less successful, of which the most important
is “spot” (near-immediate delivery) foreign exchange (see table 2). The ex-
amination of these othermarkets is not a formal comparative analysis: there
are too many variables and too few cases, and the latter are too interwoven.
Rather, those other markets are touched on brieﬂy here to demonstrate the
speciﬁcity and contingency of how U.S. shares are traded and thus to show
that the conﬂicts that have shaped share trading are more than its now-
irrelevant past.
This threefold analysis brings together two strands within economic so-
ciology that are ordinarily thought of as different, even in conﬂict. One is
Callon and Latour’s actor-network theory, which emphasizes the role of
technologies and other nonhuman entities in social relations, even being
prepared to entertain the classiﬁcation of such entities as “actors” (see, e.g.,
Latour 2005). Clearly, a case can be made for calling an algorithm that
makes share-trading decisions without direct human involvement an actor,
but whether or not to do so is a red herring here: it depends on what one
means by “action” and “agency.”Rather, what is needed from actor-network4 It involves the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms into economic sectors: an example is the correlation
between the share prices of two corporations viewed bymarket participants as exposed to
the same underlying economic factors. For sociological analyses of the classiﬁcation of
ﬁrms, see Zuckerman (1999, 2000) and Beunza and Garud (2007).
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TABLE 1
The Main Classes of Signals Employed in HFT in U.S. Shares
Classes of Signals Signals
Widely used:
Futures lead Changes in market for share-index futures (which usually
slightly precede changes in the market in the underlying
shares)
Order book dynamics Transactions in the shares being traded and other changes
in the “order book” for them on the venue on which an
algorithm is trading, e.g., changes in the balance of bids to
buy and offers to sell
Fragmentation Transactions in or changes in the order books for the same
shares on different trading venues
Related shares and other
instruments
Changes in themarket for, e.g., shareswhose price is correlated
with that of the shares being traded
Specialized classes:
News Machine-readable corporate or macroeconomic news releases
Stale midpoint matching Out-of-date prices being used in the execution of transactions
at themidpoint of the highest bid price and lowest offer price
No longer extant class:
SOES banditry Repricing of bids and offers byNasdaq’s ofﬁcial marketmakers
(e.g., because they were executing a large institutional
investor order)This content do
All use subject to University of NOTE.—A “signal” is a data pattern that informs an algorithm’s trading. This article exam-
ines the uses by HFT algorithms of the ﬁrst three of these classes of signal, the material forms
those signals take, and the processes that have given rise to them. SOES was Nasdaq’s Small
Order Execution System (see the section HFT and the Transformation of Share Trading).TABLE 2
Rough Estimates of the HFT Share of Trading Volumes
Estimated Share
U.S. sharesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Around half
U.S. futuresa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Around half
Benchmark U.S. Treasurysb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Around half
Nonbenchmark Treasurysb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Little HFT
Spot foreign exchangec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Around a tenthwnloaded from 129.215.185.018 on Jun
Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (hNOTE.—Only approximateﬁgures aregiven,because publicly availablequan-
titative data do not identify trading by HFT ﬁrms. The benchmark U.S. Trea-
surys are the most recently issued two-, three-, ﬁve-, seven-, and 10-year notes
and 30-year bonds. Spot foreign exchange refers to transactions for near-
immediate delivery.
a Miscellaneous sources (e.g., Meyer et al. 2015; Meyer and Bullock 2017).
b Michael Spencer, chief executive of ICAP (owner of BrokerTec trading
platform), as quoted by Leising (2014); interviewee FO.
c Based on the volumes transacted by “hedge funds and PTFs [proprietary
trading ﬁrms],” as reported by central banks to the Bank for International Set-
tlements (2016, p. 13, table 5).e 14, 2018 07:19:57 AM
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Alltheory is its emphasis on materiality—on physicality, technicality, and em-
bodiment (MacKenzie 2009)—and on howmateriality is enacted. For exam-
ple, Callon and those, such as the author, inﬂuenced by him have highlighted
the pervasive role of “market devices” in economic life (see, e.g., Callon,Millo,
andMuniesa 2007). While the word “device” hardly does justice to the huge,
quicksilver, pulsating technological system just sketched, economic interac-
tion in that system plainly takes a material form.
That materiality can loosely be called “Einsteinian”: the materiality of a
domain in which, as a result of how the practices of HFT have evolved, the
speed of light has become a binding constraint. “Now you have to be under
a microsecond,” interviewee AG told me in October 2016: an HFT algo-
rithm needs to respond to at least the simpler types of signal in less than a
millionth of a second (this contrasts with my ﬁrst interviewwith him, in De-
cember 2011, when a leisurely ﬁve-microsecond response was adequate). In
amicrosecond, light in a ﬁber-optic cable travels only around 200meters; an
electromagnetic signal transmitted through the atmosphere only 300 me-
ters. Precise physical locations—of a computer server, a microwave or mil-
limeter wave dish, or laser—are therefore exquisitely important and some-
times are the object of ﬁerce competition. Nor is the material world simply
what is struggled over. Rather, the very outcomes of struggles are inﬂu-
enced by the material circumstances in which they take place and by the
material capacities that are brought to bear.
Actor-network inﬂected economic sociology remains controversial, how-
ever. It has been sharply criticized for neglecting issues of what might be
called “political economy,” such as “the effects of government and law
and the role of pre-existing relationships” (Fligstein and Dauter 2007, p. 107;
see also, e.g., Hardin and Rottinghaus [2015] and, more polemically, Mi-
rowski and Nik-Khah [2007]). This article’s historical sociology of HFT
demonstrates effects of exactly the kind that Fligstein and Dauter point to.
The signals that inﬂuence how algorithms trade are in good part the result
of a succession of episodes of meso-level conﬂict about features of trading
that gave some traders and some exchanges structural advantages—epi-
sodes inwhich government agencies were entangled and lawwas sometimes
prominent.
As just suggested, the outcome of that succession of episodes reﬂects not
only relationships directly among human beings but also—just as actor-
network theorywould predict—the lasting inﬂuences of technological choices
and of theway inwhich algorithms alter the balance of power amonghuman
beings. However, the salience of meso-level conﬂict and of structural advan-
tage suggests the need to complement the actor-network focus onmateriality
with a different perspective that highlights these aspects of economic life.
Particularly useful for the analysis in this article is the theory of “ﬁelds,” es-
pecially as developed by Fligstein andMacAdam (2012). For them, a ﬁeld is1640
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Material Signalsa structured meso-level domain in which participants orient themselves to
each other. There is “something at stake” (often something speciﬁc to the do-
main), differential access to resources, “rules of the game,” and structurally
more favorable (and less favorable) positions. There is cooperation, compe-
tition, and sometimes conﬂict, the last of these at least potentially involving
challenges to the “rules of the game” (Kluttz and Fligstein 2016, p. 185). This
view of ﬁelds builds directly on the sociology of markets, in particular as put
forward in Fligstein (1996, 2001), and is among the versions of ﬁeld theory
that acknowledge path dependence in how ﬁelds develop: that, in the words
of Martin’s review of ﬁeld theory, see social action as “saturated with his-
tory” (Martin 2003, p. 44).
Two immediate provisos are needed. First, to be applicable here, ﬁeld
theory needs to be given a more materialist twist than is common (although
some ﬁeld theorists, notably Bourdieu, are attentive to materiality; see, e.g.,
Bourdieu 1970, 1977). For example, as already indicated, the positions strug-
gled over by HFT ﬁrms are physical locations, not just socioeconomic roles.
Second, what follows is not a systematic ﬁeld-theoretic analysis. Rather,
ﬁeld theory is invoked because it sensitizes us, much more directly than actor-
network theory does, to four crucial issues.
Three of those issues (meso-level conﬂict, structural advantage, and path
dependence) have already been touched on above. The fourth is another basic
precept of modern sociological ﬁeld theory: the outcomes of conﬂicts in a
ﬁeld typically depend on developments in adjacent ﬁelds (Fligstein and
McAdam 2012, chap. 4). HFT is, plainly, a type of trading, and trading is
clearly a ﬁeld in which there is contestation, for proﬁts and sometimes for le-
gitimacy. Central to this article’s analysis, however, is that the conﬂicts that
have resulted in the signals available to HFT algorithms have overﬂowed
the ﬁeld of trading. Their outcomes have been inﬂuenced by developments
in three other domains that can also be conceptualized as ﬁelds: exchanges,
regulation, and politics (see ﬁg. 2). Politics is also clearly a contested ﬁeld, as
are exchanges (competition for market share—and, again, sometimes also
for legitimacy—is ﬁerce). It is less obvious to think of regulation as a con-
tested ﬁeld (rather than simply a ﬁxed external constraint on trading), but
U.S. ﬁnancial markets are characterized by the presence of multiple federal
regulatory bodies (and even some state regulators, especially New York’s,
play signiﬁcant roles). In particular, two federal regulators—the SecuritiesFIG. 2.—Four ﬁelds or “ecologies”1641
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Alland Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC)—have fought repeated “turf battles,” and (as will be
shown below) their split jurisdiction was the source of the historically pri-
mary HFT signal that I call “futures lead.”
The term that I will use for the type of link among adjacent ﬁelds on
which I will focus is taken not from ﬁeld theory per se, but from Abbott’s
“linked ecologies” perspective: a “hinge,” in other words, a process that gen-
erates rewards inmore than one ﬁeld or, in Abbott’s terminology, more than
one “ecology.” (Although Abbott’s perspective is not ordinarily thought of
as a ﬁeld theory, an ecology is a ﬁeld-like “set of social relations . . . best un-
derstood in terms of interactions between multiple elements that . . . con-
strain or contest each other,” just as the actors in a ﬁeld do [Abbott 2005,
p. 248].)5 The attractively succinct term “hinge” aside, what makes Abbott’s
work on linked ecologies particularly relevant here is his discussion of how
the temporal rhythm of one pervasively important ecology, politics, differs
from that of many others. Issues that are continuously important in one or
more of those other ﬁelds or ecologies (medical licensing in Abbott’s main
example of linked ecologies; here, how shares should be traded) are often only
sporadically salient politically, becausemost of the time there are fewpolitical
rewards for pursuing them.
The hinges that link politics to the ﬁelds or ecologies of trading, exchanges,
and ﬁnancial regulation—or, in Abbott’s chief example, the ecology of the
professions—are thus typically transient and contingent, even idiosyncratic.
(Idiosyncrasy needs to be emphasized: the overall research found no common
pattern to the hinges to politics in the different markets examined.) What fol-
lows, however, does not entirely conﬁrm Abbott’s assertion of “the near im-
possibility of creating institutionalized linkages between ecologies. . . . There
is . . . noway to build a perfect hinge” (2005, pp. 247–48, 269). One signal to be
discussed below—futures lead—does involve an institutionalized hinge be-
tween politics and the ecologies of ﬁnance.
The article proceeds as follows. A brief description of data sources ends
this introduction. The second section draws on my interviews with high-
frequency traders to identify the main classes of HFT signal and their roles
in how algorithms interact. Then follows a section on how the ﬁrst class of5 In an unpublished section ofAbbott (2005), he points to differences between his approach
and what he suggests are over-rigid aspects of Bourdieu’s ﬁeld theory (Abbott, n.d.; see
also, e.g., Bourdieu 1984, 1996). It is far less clear, though, that there are any profound dif-
ferences between Abbott’s approach and the more ﬂexible ﬁeld theory of Fligstein and
McAdam (2012). Furthermore, while Abbott’s deﬁnition of ecology is not explicitly meso-
level, nearly all his actual examples are. Unfortunately, however, neither Fligstein andMac-
Adam (2012) nor Kluttz and Fligstein (2016) consider Abbott’s work in their discussions of
ﬁeld theory. For a previous application of Abbott’s linked ecologies to ﬁnancial regulation,
see Du Gay, Millo, and Tuck (2012, pp. 1090–93).
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Material Signalssignal—futures lead—came into being and two sections (Centralization
versus the Intermarket Trading System and HFT and the Transformation
of Share Trading) that examine two phases in the later, interwoven emer-
gence of the second and third classes. The second of those sections also
sketches the process by which algorithmic trading has come to dominate
the U.S. stockmarket. A sixth section brieﬂy compares the trading of shares
to that of futures, Treasurys, and foreign exchange. The seventh section is
the conclusion.Data Sources
This article draws on interviews with 194 market participants, including
54 founders, employees, or ex-employees ofHFT ﬁrms (see table 3). Because
of commercial conﬁdentiality, HFT’s material practices are a tricky topic
for interviewing, so a ﬁxed interview schedule could not be employed.6 The
interviews with high-frequency traders were more like conversations, while
I tried gently but persistently—andwithwidely varying degrees of success—
to elicit information onHFTpractices, the inﬂuences on those practices, and
(if the interviewee had long enough experience of HFT) changes in those
practices through time. Nor, given the absence of any list of high-frequency
traders, could probabilistic sampling be used. I began by approaching trad-
ers identiﬁed via the trade press or, for example, whom I met at industry
meetings and then snowballed from these initial interviewees. As differences
between HFT practices in different markets emerged, interviewing was ex-
tended to members and staff of exchanges and other trading venues and to
regulators involved in particularly crucial episodes, to help understand the
different paths of change followed by differentmarkets. The other categories
of interviewees listed in table 3 provided either speciﬁc information or useful
triangulation. For example, what HFT interviewees said about the signals
employed by their algorithms was cross-checked by interviewing those who
supply HFT ﬁrms with the communication links via which signals are trans-
mitted.
I was also able to visit two of the data centers in which HFT takes place,
attended two HFT industry meetings and an algorithmic trading training
event, and was often shown round HFT ﬁrms’ ofﬁces before or after in-
terviews. In the historical aspects of the research, documentary sources—
including the trade press and the memoirs of key participants, such as
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s LeoMelamed (Melamed and Tamarkin
1996)—were consultedwherever available. The emergent literature onHFT6 A report for the U.K. Government’s Foresight Project on HFT (Brogaard 2011) was,
however, helpful in framing my initial questions on algorithms’ use of signals.
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Allin ﬁnancial economics (most recently reviewed inMenkveld [2016]) was care-
fully read for the evidence that some of it contains on whether particular
classes of signal do indeed have potential predictive value andwhether trad-
ing patterns are consistent with use of those signals in HFT.SIGNALS AND HOW THEY INFLUENCE HOW
ALGORITHMS INTERACT
To understand how signals inﬂuence the behavior of HFT algorithms, we
need ﬁrst to describe the main way in which those algorithms materially in-
teract with each other, with execution algorithms, and indeed with human
traders: by entering orders into an exchange’s “order book,” an electronic
ﬁle of the bids to buy each stock and the offers to sell it. (See ﬁg. 3 for a visual
representation of an order book.) In traders’ terminology, a new order either
“takes” or “makes.” An order that “takes” is one that an exchange’s “match-
ing engine” (the software that maintains the order book) can execute against
an existing order already in the book: in ﬁgure 3, a new order to buy shares
at $7.75 would take because it would be executed against existing offers to
sell at $7.75. In contrast, an order that “makes”—or, as traders would often
put it, that “provides liquidity”—is one that cannot immediately be exe-
cuted (in ﬁg. 3, an example would be an order to buy shares at $7.74, a price
at which there are no existing offers) and is therefore simply added to the
order book.
While an algorithm can both take andmake, interviewees consistently re-
ported that they themselves, their algorithms, groups of traders, and some-
times even entire ﬁrms tend to specialize in one or the other. Taking is faster
thanmaking (amaking order may indeed never be executed) but is also nor-TABLE 3
Interviewees
Type Number
High-frequency traders (AA–CC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Exchange and trading venue members and staff (EA–GB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Dealers, brokers, and broker-dealers (DA–DT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Institutional investment ﬁrms’ traders (IA–ID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Practitioners of other forms of algorithmic trading (OA–OM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Manual traders (MA–MH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Regulators (RA–RH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Suppliers of technology and telecommunications links to HFT (SA–SR) . . . . . . . 18
Researchers/market analysts (UA–UO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1941644
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Material Signalsmally at least a cent per share more expensive: in the example just given,
taking involves buying shares at $7.75 or more, while a maker can hope
to buy at $7.74 or less. (In share trading, most exchanges also now incentiv-
ize liquidity provision bymaking small payments—known as “rebates”—to
ﬁrms whose making orders are executed against. Liquidity takers, in con-
trast, have to pay fees to the exchange.) The greater expense of takingmeans
that an algorithmwill do so only if it receives a relatively clear indication—a
strong signal—that prices are about to move sufﬁciently to make that prof-
itable.
A former high-frequency trader, in informal conversation, gave a simple
example. If a liquidity-taking algorithm in one of the New Jersey data cen-
ters is trading shares in the SPY (a type of share—an “exchange-traded
fund” or ETF—that tracks an index, in this case the Standard and Poor’s
[S&P] 500) and it learns that themarket price of theES or “e-Mini” (a futures
contract that tracks the same index) has suddenly increased by “four ticks
[price increments],” that is an unequivocally strong signal. The taking algo-
rithm will immediately dispatch an electronic order to buy whatever SPY
shares are still offered at the old price (a price that market participants
would call “stale”). Many of those offers will have been entered by HFT al-
gorithms that specialize in the systematic form of liquidity provision known
as “market making,”which involves constantly keeping in order books both
bids to buy and slightly higher-priced offers to sell. These making algo-
rithms will also receive the same signal from the futures market and will
seek as quickly as possible to “get out of the way,” as a specialist in makingFIG. 3.—Order book for shares of Astoria Financial Corp. on Nasdaq, c. noon, Octo-
ber 21, 2011. On the left-hand side are the aggregated bids to buy Astoria shares: for ex-
ample, there are bids to buy 192 shares at $7.74. On the right-hand side are the corre-
sponding offers to sell. Source: extracted from ﬁgure 5.1645
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Allwould say: to cancel their now stale offers and replace themwith new offers
at a higher price. As CB, a specialist in market making, put it, “our need for
speed . . . is almost without exception defensive in nature,” but it is no less
pressing for that.
In the terminology of the ﬁeld, taking algorithms thus often seek simply to
“pick off” (to execute against) knowably stale bids or offers, while making
algorithms—receiving the same signal—seek to cancel such bids or offers
before they are executed against. It is a very simple pattern of interaction
(more subtle patterns are discussed at the end of this section), and the eco-
nomics literature on HFT contains a straightforward, insightful model of it
(Budish, Cramton, and Shim 2015). It is, however, as Budish et al. point out,
the core driver of a ceaseless “arms race” pursuit of speed, which takes ma-
terial form both inside data centers and in the microwave, millimeter wave,
and laser links among them.
But what are thematerial signals that indicate to both taking andmaking
algorithms that a bid or offer is stale? As already noted, a “signal,” as high-
frequency traders use the term, is a pattern in the data received by an HFT
algorithm that can be used to inform the algorithm’s trading: typically, a
pattern that has predictive value. It was, of course, not feasible for me sim-
ply to ask traders to list the signals their algorithms use: that would at best
cause unease. Nevertheless, the HFT interviews—alongwith cross-checking
with suppliers of communication links and with the economics literature
onHFT—led to the identiﬁcation of the seven classes of signal listed in table 1.Futures Lead
The example given above of the ES share-index future ticking up four
points is an instance of the signal that I call “futures lead” (there is no set
“native” term for it). Futures lead was hugely important to the emergence
of HFT in the 1990s, because at that point the second and third classes of
today’s HFT signals (order book dynamics and “fragmentation”) did not
yet exist, at least in full, usable form. The dominant venues for U.S. share
trading were the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE did disseminate
the sizes and prices of transactions, but the contents of its order books were
private to designated traders called “specialists”) and Nasdaq, which did
not have central order books. The NYSE and Nasdaq did not compete di-
rectly with each other, meaning that fragmentation was limited. TheNYSE
traded only NYSE-listed shares; Nasdaq traded only shares not listed on the
NYSE or other exchanges.
In futures lead, any substantial change in the prices of, or order books for,
share-index futures is treated by HFT algorithms as indicating a likely
near-term change, in the same direction, in the market for the underlying
shares. Interviewee EH emphasized the signal’s importance to taking algo-1646
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Material Signalsrithms: if “the futuresmove up . . . shoot to a premium . . . then they’ll [taking
algorithms will] take all the underlying cash [buy the corresponding ETF
and/or the shares underpinning the index tracked by the futures contract].”
Futures lead is at least equally important formarket-making algorithms. “If
you’remaking amarket in . . . SPY [the ETF share that tracks the S&P 500],
certainly seeing something big happening in ES [the corresponding futures
contract]” means that your algorithm needs immediately to “get . . . out of
the way,” says interviewee AX. “Sure, we [our algorithms] utilize futures
prices for making predictions in U.S. cash equities [shares],” says market-
maker BL. If “the S&P Mini [ES index future] in Chicago has exhausted
at a certain level [all the bids or offers at that price have been executed
against or canceled], we knowwith certainty that something is going to hap-
pen in the U.S. equity market. So we can’t just be sitting out there waiting
to get picked off,” says CB.
Interview testimony such as this is backed by econometric evidence that
(a) movements in the futures market do indeed have predictive value (see,
e.g., Hasbrouck 2003) and (b) HFT ﬁrms trade U.S. shares in ways consis-
tent with their use of this signal (see Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan
2014).7 Further evidence of the salience of futures lead is the huge impor-
tance that HFT ﬁrms trading shares in the data centers in New Jersey place
on the material means by which signals are transmitted from the Chicago
futuresmarkets. The best-known example (because it is described in Lewis’s
[2014] bestseller Flash Boys) is the laying of a new ﬁber-optic cable, which
entered use in 2010, that closely follows the geodesics fromChicago to north-
ern New Jersey (see ﬁg. 4), and was therefore faster than any previous cable.
As Lewis says, and former high-frequency trader Peter Kovac (2014, p. 1)
conﬁrms, the cable’s owner, Spread Networks, charged HFT ﬁrms $176,000
a month to use the cable’s fastest ﬁbers and—interviewee BB reports—in-
sisted that users sign a nonrevocable ﬁve-year contract. HFT ﬁrms making
markets in U.S. shares and taking ﬁrms whose algorithms employed futures
lead had, however, little choice but to accept these onerous terms.
The Chicago–New Jersey speed race, however, both predates the Spread
cable and has continued since. Early in the 2000s, a telecommunications
specialist approached a Chicago HFT ﬁrm with the proposal to help it ﬁnd
what Chicago traders came to call “the gold line.”This involved identifying
segments of existing ﬁber-optic cables that could, as interviewee CC told
me, be “pars[ed]” or “knit [ted]” together to form the fastest route, and then
persuading their owners to lease them: “No, I don’t want to go through the7 The evidence of this in Brogaard et al.’s (2014) study is indirect, since they do not em-
ploy Chicago Mercantile Exchange data, but there is direct evidence of exploitable op-
portunities in the study by Budish et al. (2015), who do.
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Material Signalsswitching station in [townA]. Iwant to go to the switching station in [townB].”
The exact route of the gold line is unclear (other interviewees who worked
for the ﬁrm in question in that period either did not know the route or were
reluctant to disclose it), but CC says—plausibly—that it roughly followed
Interstate 80 across northernOhio, Pennsylvania, and northernNew Jersey.
Having the gold line, interviewees reported, helped make the ﬁrm the prime
proponent of HFT until around 2011.
Light in a ﬁber-optic cable is, however, slowed by the ﬁber’s refractive
index, which is around 1.5 (e.g., 1.47 for Lucent TrueWave RS, the material
of the Spread cable). Fiber-optic signals therefore travel at only about two-
thirds of the speed of light in a vacuum. The refractive index of the atmo-
sphere, in contrast, is very close to 1.0. In consequence, since 2011 the un-
equivocally fastest form of transmission from Chicago to New Jersey has
been microwave. (The millimeter wave and laser transmission used within
New Jersey so far has been less attractive over the 1,200 kilometers from
Chicago because many more intermediate towers and signal regenerators/
ampliﬁers would be needed. To accommodate microwave’s more limited
bandwidth, only the most directly relevant futures data are transmitted.)
Although the Chicago–New Jersey microwave links are now within less
than 50 microseconds of the Einsteinian limit, there is relentless pressure,
described by interviewee SJ, to keep speeding them up. There is constant
jostling to place microwave dishes on existing towers, or build new towers,
as close as possible to the geodesic. Every unnecessarymeter traveled is now
shaved off, for example, by placing microwave ampliﬁers/repeaters high on
the towers rather than having signals go down the tower to a bunker at its
base and then back up again.
These ultrafast microwave links can, however, be interrupted by the
most mundane of material phenomena—rain (and also snow)—which, as
a result, can inﬂuence how HFT algorithms interact. Consequent effects
on patterns of U.S. share prices have been documented in the ﬁnancial eco-
nomics literature (Shkilko and Sokolov 2016). When microwave links cre-
ated by HFT ﬁrms ﬁrst became fully operational in 2011–12, the fastest of
those links were employed by taking algorithms to pick off market-making
algorithms. When rain or snow led the links to fail, the speed advantage of
these taking algorithms was removed, and standard measures of liquidity
therefore improved. By the end of 2012, however,HFT ﬁrmsmore generally
had begun to rent microwave bandwidth or to buy ultrafast data from a
technology supplier, McKay Brothers, whose Chicago–New Jersey micro-
wave link was, and is, at least as fast as the quickest privately owned links.
Doing so reduced the risk of market-making algorithms being picked off, so
these effects of rain on liquidity vanished again. (My interview data suggest
they have been replaced by a different effect of rain on the interaction of
HFT algorithms, but space constraints prevent discussion of it here.)1649
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AllThe materiality of futures lead had another intriguing aspect, ﬁrst hinted
at in an October 2011 interview:1650
 use sInterviewee AC: Some companies don’t wait for the [Chicago Mercantile]
Exchange to tell them what’s trading.
Author: Oh, so how do you manage to . . .?
Interviewee AC: That I can’t. . . . I mean not only would I lose my job,
I might lose my legs too!(In a later interview, AC said that he had received this warning from a se-
niormember of his ﬁrm: “The look on his facewas stone seriousness. Hewas
not joking at all.”) When the issue surfaced in theWall Street Journal (Pat-
terson, Strasburg, and Pleven 2013), AC conﬁrmed what he had previously
hinted at: when one of a trading ﬁrm’s bids or offers had been executed,
Globex (theChicagoMercantileExchange’s electronic trading system)would
often send the ﬁrm the electronic “conﬁrm” message a fraction of a second
before the transaction appeared in the general Globex data feed. A conﬁrm
could therefore provide a vital early indicator that the prices of futures were
moving, thus giving a structural advantage to those share-trading HFT
ﬁrms, often based in Chicago, that also traded share-index futures (inter-
viewee EW). As Globex was reengineered, the time difference shrank; but
even in 2013, reported interviewee AJ, “you know about your ﬁll one to
two milliseconds [thousandths of a second] ahead of everyone else.” With
HFT response times measured by then in millionths of seconds, that was
potentially of great importance.Order Book Dynamics
Historically primary though it was, and important as it still is, futures lead is
often eclipsed as an everyday concern of high-frequency traders by a much
wider, and more complex, second class of signal, order book dynamics:
transactions in the shares being traded and other changes in the order book
for them. One example of this class of signal is a changed balance of bids to
offers. If, for instance, “there are more buyers than sellers . . . that signal . . .
we try to detect before anyone else” (interviewee AM). A situation of that
kind—in which bids clearly outweigh offers—would be described bymy in-
terviewees as a situation of “order book pressure,” signaling a coming price
rise (or a fall, if offers greatly exceeded bids). The predictive value of the sig-
nal, and a pattern of trading consistent with its use by HFT algorithms, is
conﬁrmed by the economics literature (Brogaard et al. 2014). The necessary
level of sophistication in howHFT algorithms process order book data has,
however, increased through time. In the early 2000s, said AG, “you could
basically say ‘is the bid bigger than the offer?’ and . . . not to say that that’sThis content downloaded from 129.215.185.018 on June 14, 2018 07:19:57 AM
ubject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Material Signalscompletely meaningless today, but it would be a lot more nuanced than
that.”
Today’s stock exchanges do not directly disseminate the electronic equiv-
alents of ﬁgure 3: that would be too slow, because the complete order book
for a heavily traded stock is a large data structure. Rather, following the
practice of the 1990s share-trading venue Island (discussed below), each
update to the order book—each transaction, each new order, each cancella-
tion of an existing order—is disseminated by an exchange’s “feed server” or
“market data publisher” system as a separate message; the vast ﬂow of mes-
sages among data centers referred to in this article’s initial paragraphs con-
sists mainly of these updates. Trading ﬁrms’ computer servers use these
messages to synthesize a continuous “mirror” of the exchange’s order book.8
It is hugely important to HFT ﬁrms that their algorithms receive this
stream of order book update messages as quickly as possible. That is one
of the two main reasons for HFT’s most distinctive spatial aspect: “colo-
cation,” which involves placing HFT ﬁrms’ servers in the same building
as, andwithin that building as close as possible to, an exchange’s “matching
engines,” which, as noted, are the computer systems that maintain order
books. (The other main reason for colocation is so that the matching engines
receive HFT algorithms’ bids, offers, and cancellations with the minimum
delay.) Interviewees reported that, in most trading of U.S. shares and fu-
tures, cables are coiled so that the length of the connection of each trading
ﬁrm’s servers to the order gateways—the portals to the matching engines—
is the same. However, a structural advantage can be gained by paying
higher fees (of around $20,000 monthly) for a connection that has a higher
bandwidth (and is therefore normally faster, evenwith equal cable lengths) or
fewer digital switches between the ﬁrm’s servers and the matching engines.
Interviewee SJ’s ﬁrm, for example, has measured an average time difference
of three microseconds (three times interviewee AG’s one-microsecond HFT
benchmark) on one exchange between the standard and the fastest connec-
tion.Fragmentation
“Fragmentation” is what I call the third class of signals: again, there is no
settled participants’ term. It arises because the same shares are traded on
more than one exchange or trading venue. (There are 13 registered exchanges
onwhichU.S. shares are traded, the computer systems of all but one ofwhich
are in data centers illustrated in ﬁg. 1, and also around 40 trading venues that
are not exchanges, of whichmost are “dark pools,” in which the order book is8 Most exchanges allow trading ﬁrms to submit “hidden orders,” which are not dissemi-
nated; those orders, however, are placed behind visible orders in the queue for execution.
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Allnot visible.) The simplest form taken by fragmentation is the case in which
shares can be bought on one trading venuemore cheaply than they can be sold
on another. That, however, is increasingly rare, interviewees reported: “it hap-
pens less frequently and [it is] not a key part of the [HFT] business” (AX).
The much more pervasive use of fragmentation is the case in which the
buy, sell, and cancellation decisions by an algorithm trading shares on one
venue are informed by signals in the data feeds from other venues that indi-
cate signiﬁcant transactions or other changes in their order books for the same
shares. A standardHFTpractice is for a ﬁrm’s servers locally to aggregate all
these separate order books: “I justwrote that code lastweek,” intervieweeBQ
toldme (see ﬁg. 5 for a visual representation of a composite order book of this
kind). “Maybe on top of the composite [order book] you also say, I know this
exchange is the fastest so I give a little bit more juice [a heavier weighting in
the algorithm’s calculations] to the orders from that exchange,” said BV.
The continuous updating of composite order books by HFT ﬁrms’ serv-
ers creates tight, ultrarapid linkages among the ﬁvemain share-trading data
centers: if, for example, a large buy order is executed in one data center,
“other participants are going to be pulling that stock [their algorithms will
be canceling their offers] from those [other] venues,” said BL. “You’re look-
ing at the . . . order books for all the different markets,” he continued: “every
little change to those [data] feeds [from those markets] is digested and calcu-
lated locally in numerous different geographic locations, and you’re passing
all that data in real time between locations. . . .That’swhere your investment
in low-latency technology really is.”
The huge volumes of data that therefore need to be transmitted among
the ﬁve share-trading data centers mean that microwave links are not em-
ployed. Their bandwidth is insufﬁcient, and the difﬁculty of gaining permis-
sion to build tall enough towers in prosperous areas of New Jersey—espe-
cially, as interviewee SJ told me, at or close to the NYSE data center, which
is in a dip in the terrain—removes the speed advantage that they would oth-
erwise have over higher-bandwidth millimeter wave and atmospheric laser
links. (Microwave is potentially faster because it has no need for intermedi-
ate ampliﬁcation at the distances involved in New Jersey; but microwave
signals require a direct “line-of-sight” path, and so tall towers are needed
if source and receiver are far apart.) Again, spatial location can yield struc-
tural advantage. In the case of millimeter wave, for example, ﬁrms want to
place their dishes directly on the roofs of the ﬁve data centers rather than
on towers outside them.9 They can pay to do this on the roofs of NY4,
NY5, and NJ2, but Nasdaq and the NYSE themselves supply millimeter9 The point is to minimize what those involved call “ﬁber tail”: the distance over which a
signal has to run through ﬁber-optic cable, with its higher refractive index.
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Material Signalswave links (via contractors) and—citing space limitations and risks of radio
interference—have gained the SEC’s permission to restrict other ﬁrms’ ac-
cess to their roofs or, in the case of NYSE, to a pole that has been erected
within the grounds of its data center (SEC 2013, 2015).FIG. 5.—Orders for shares of Astoria Financial Corp. on U.S. trading venues, c. noon,
October 21, 2011. Note that the zeroes of “round-lot” bids and offers are not displayed (a
round-lot order is for 100 shares or an integer multiple of 100). Thus the ﬁrst three bids in
the left-hand column are for 192, 800, and 200 shares. Source: interviewee.1653
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AllOther Shared Signals
The correlation between the prices of the same shares traded on different
exchanges is of course very high, but there is also a fourth, wider class of
signals in extensive use in HFT, in which correlation levels are lower but
still useful: for example, movements in commodity prices or currencies that
correlate with share prices, or changes in the prices of shares in corporations
that are viewed as being in the same sector. “Citibankmoves, what does that
mean for Bank of America?” (interviewee BL). “There are correlations that
are not structural in nature . . . for example the relationship between
Microsoft and Oracle,” said interviewee AE. “They are companies that are
in the same industry, so they’ll be correlated because they’re driven by com-
mon factors like demand for certain kinds of software or economic growth
more generally, or the fact that, you know, people’s hedging patterns [make]
them correlate or the fact that they’re in the same index, orwhat have you.”10
The four classes of signal just discussed are “about 99% of everything” in
HFT in shares, interviewee BL toldme, and—despite extensive probing—I
have not found another class that is anything like as widely used (see table 1).
For example, while some HFT ﬁrms do make use of machine-readable cor-
porate or macroeconomic news, that is a specialized activity: on the micro-
second timescale of HFT, items of news of this kind (or, e.g., changes in
social-media “sentiment”) are very rare events. There is of course secret
sauce, but from interviewees’ generic descriptions of its contents, it seems
mainly to concern how best to employ the fourmain classes of shared signal,
especially the most complex of them, order book dynamics.More Subtle Forms of the Interaction of Algorithms
The interviews also suggest, however, forms of algorithmic interaction dif-
ferent in kind from the simple speed-race interaction of making and taking
algorithms discussed above. One such form is the interaction between HFT
algorithms and “execution algorithms,”which, as noted in the introduction,
divide up large orders from institutional investors into small, hopefully in-
conspicuous, child orders. That was a particularly difﬁcult topic to explore
in interviews: HFT interviewees are sharply aware of accusations (see, e.g.,
Lewis 2014) that HFT algorithms identify and prey on execution algo-
rithms, for example, buying shares ahead of them and then selling those
shares to them at higher prices. Some denied that their particular ﬁrm’s al-10 Correlation or co-integration of this sort is widely documented in the economics liter-
ature, albeit generally at timescales quite different from those of HFT (e.g., the daily data
used byGatev, Goetzmann, andRouwenhorst [2006]). For pointers to a sociological anal-
ysis of it, see n. 4 above.
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ply said that a big institutional order inevitably had detectable effects on or-
der book dynamics, despite efforts to disguise those effects by randomizing
the sizes and arrival times of child orders. Execution algorithms are still “ex-
tremely predicable,” said HFT interviewee AO: “I don’t really think they
have any other way of being.” Execution algorithms “can’t randomize that
much,” he went on, because of the constraint of having to execute the big
parent order in a limited amount of time.
A different form of predictable behavior is that of HFT algorithms them-
selves. It arises from their pervasive use of the four main classes of signal
(which, interviewees reported, are most usually combined in what is in ef-
fect simply a linear regression equation, the dependent variable in which
is the predicted near-future price of the shares being traded). The simplest
way of exploiting the resultant deterministic behavior is what participants
call “spooﬁng,” which involves manipulation of the material signal that is
easiest to alter: the contents of the order book. A “spoofer” (human or algo-
rithmic) injects orders into the book to create apparent “book pressure” (an
excess of bids over offers, or vice versa) and proﬁts from HFT algorithms’
predictable responses to that pressure, while canceling the spoof orders be-
fore they are executed.
Although informally tolerated until quite recently (Arnoldi 2016), spoof-
ing is now increasingly the subject of criminal charges that carry jail terms.
There are, however, legal ways—generally involving taking liquidity rather
than the (apparent) making liquidity involved in spooﬁng—in which more
sophisticated algorithms can exploit deterministic behavior by simpler HFT
algorithms. Nearly all today’s electronic order books are anonymous, but
some order book behavior has been in effect de-anonymized by technologi-
cal advances in the system sketched at the start of this article: in particular,
reduction in “jitter” (random speed ﬂuctuations) in the processing of orders
by exchanges and ultraprecise atomic-clock synchronization of time mea-
surement across exchanges. These advancesmake it possible (although tech-
nologically still hugely challenging, because the data sets that need to be cap-
tured and analyzed are gigantic) to identify patterns in the order book’s
responses to speciﬁc material signals, patterns that are most likely the result
of signal-determined actions by the sameHFTalgorithm and therefore likely
to recur. The formal anonymity of today’s order book trading can thus in ef-
fect collapse in the face of machine-learning technology that provides auto-
mated answers to questions such as “Howmuch does this [order book event]
look like previous events? How many of those previous events have I seen?
So what is the probability that this is like all those previous events?” (inter-
viewee AJ). None of this sophistication, however, reduces the importance
of the main classes of signal as determinants of the behavior of HFT algo-
rithms: indeed, what I have just described is in essence simply a different,1655
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prediction of this kind is, as it were, layered on top of “ﬁrst-level,” direct,
algorithmic responses to the main classes of shared signals, which create
the predictability that more sophisticated algorithms can sometimes ex-
ploit.THE ORIGINS AND LONGEVITY OF FUTURES LEAD
What gave rise to these pervasively important shared signals in the ﬁrst
place? Let us begin with “futures lead.” It is the result of an initially idiosyn-
cratic early-1970s hinge between the ﬁelds of exchanges and of politics that
has become institutionalized. The exchanges in question were futures ex-
changes, especially the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), whose chair,
LeoMelamed, was seeking greater legitimacy for a scandal-damaged sector
and hoping to remove a legal obstacle to its expanding from agricultural
commodities into ﬁnancial derivatives, especially share-index futures (Me-
lamed, interviewed by author, November 8, 2000). The obstacle was that
Anglo-American law traditionally made the intention physically to deliver
the underlying asset the distinction between a legitimate forward trade and
awager. If delivery was not possible and a contract could therefore be settled
only by a cash payment, then it was a wager (and so illegal in Illinois, as
in much of the United States). Since it would be at best clumsy to settle a
share-index futures trade by the delivery of share certiﬁcates for dozens or
hundreds of corporations, index futures could not be traded.
On the political side of the hinge, Texas Democrat Bob Poage, who
chaired the House Agriculture Committee, was concerned by hostile hear-
ings being held on agricultural futures by the chair of the House Subcom-
mittee on General Small Business Problems, Iowa Democrat Neal Smith.
As Melamed put it in his memoirs, Poage’s committee (along with the Senate
Agriculture Committee) “by tradition should have had jurisdiction over our
markets. [Poage] knew nothing about futures and couldn’t care less, but we
[theChicago exchanges] gainedhis ear, if for no other reason than to stopSmith
from poaching on his jurisdiction” (Melamed and Tamarkin 1996, p. 215).
Melamed, Poage, and even Smith (see Smith 1996, pp. 262–64) found
common ground in a proposal to create a new federal futures regulator to
replace the existing small regulatory subunit of the Department of Agricul-
ture. That would “legitimatize what we [the futures markets] were doing.
Anyone that has a federal agency over it is a legitimate thing,” saysMelamed.
Furthermore, because the gambling bans in the United States were state, not
federal, law, a federal futures regulator could preempt them and “give [an]
edict [legalizing] cash settlement” (Melamed interview). Working with the
staff of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees, Melamed and his al-1656
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ofTrade, helpeddraft appropriate amendments to theCommodityExchange
Act.
Their plans were nearly derailed when the Ford administration, which
did not welcome the creation of an additional regulator, offered jurisdiction
over the futures markets to the stock market regulator, the SEC: “We [the
SEC] were asked whether we wanted that jurisdiction, and I have a pretty
clear memory of some of the commissioners saying, ‘what do we know
about pork bellies!’. . . They have since come to regret that, but . . . I don’t
think there was any debate about it really. They all concluded they didn’t
want to deal with that” (interviewee RG). Pork bellies—huge slabs of frozen
pork—seem to have epitomized the gross physicality of the assets underly-
ing agricultural futures. Interviewee RF, also an SEC ofﬁcial in the 1970s,
had the same recollection of the SEC commissioners’ reaction: “Whywould
wemess aroundwith pork bellies?”The way they reacted, he said, was “very
snooty, very East Coast.”
The SEC’s rejection of jurisdiction had consequences that it simply failed
to foresee. In drafting the amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act,
Melamed’s ally Johnson had added 20 carefully chosen words to the long
list of commodities (“wheat, cotton, . . .”) whose futures trading was gov-
erned by the act: “and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in” (Falloon 1998,
p. 247; Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, U.S. Senate 1974, p. 27).
The resultant change in the lawwas, in Abbott’s (2005, p. 248) terminology,
“ligation.”Rather than simply reallocating jurisdiction over existing regula-
tory tasks, the creation of the new regulator, the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC), was simultaneously the creation of new tasks:
newmarkets, previously illegal, that the CFTCwould regulate and thereby
make legally permissible.Without mentioning futures on share indexes explic-
itly—that overt intrusion into its jurisdictionwould immediately have sparked
SEC opposition—Johnson’s words implicitly cleared the way for them.
Under its Carter-appointed chair, James Stone, the CFTC did not imme-
diately give Melamed’s desired “edict” ending the requirement for physical
delivery. In 1981, however,Reagan appointedMelamed’s ally JohnsonCFTC
chair, and it then did so. A ﬁerce jurisdictional dispute between the CFTC
and SEC ﬁnally broke out over index futures, but Johnson’s careful drafting
had weakened the SEC’s legal position, and a deal struck between him and
John Shad, Reagan’s appointee as SEC chair (Millo 2007), permitted the
CME to launch S&P 500 futures in April 1982.
The new share-index futures, regulated by the CFTC, not the SEC, fol-
lowed the procedures of futures trading, not those of share trading,which gave
them structural advantages over the latter. It was simpler, faster, and cheaper
to trade a single future than to buy or sell the 500 stocks underpinning the1657
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AllS&P index, and creating a “short” position—one that would beneﬁt fromprice
falls—was a matter merely of selling the future. “Shorting” shares, in con-
trast, was cumbersome (it required one to borrow shares, sell them, and then
buy them and return them) and was hemmed in by regulation: shorts were
often blamed for share price falls. Furthermore, as with other futures con-
tracts, one could trade S&P 500 futures with only a modest “margin” deposit
with one’s broker or the CME’s clearinghouse, a deposit that one had to add
to only if prices moved against one. The regulations governing share trading,
in contrast, made it very difﬁcult to achieve an equivalent level of “leverage”:
the size of a trading position relative to the required level of capital.
Simplicity, cheapness, ease of shorting, and high leverage made the new
S&P 500 futures an attractive way of proﬁting quickly from (or hedging
against the arrival of) new information relevant to the overall value of
U.S. shares. As a result, it soon became clear that despite the fact that the
CME had no previous involvement with shares, the prices of its S&P 500
futures tended to move before—in 1984–85, as much as 20–45 minutes be-
fore—the prices of the underlying shares (Kawaller, Koch, and Koch 1987,
p. 1309). Futures lead had come into being, and—although it has now shrunk
to less than a hundredth of a second (see, e.g., Budish et al. 2015)—it still
largely persists, remaining a vitally important signal in HFT in U.S. shares,
with, as described above, huge investment in the material means of transmis-
sion from Chicago to New Jersey.
It is particularly noteworthy that, at least until very recently (interview-
ees BQ and BV report a gradual shift toward bidirectional inﬂuence), fu-
tures consistently led even the corresponding ETFs, which are shares that
are often close to economically identical to futures. The most widely traded
of all the ETFs—indeed, the world’s most widely traded share—is the
already-mentioned SPY, an ETF set up in 1993 that tracks (albeit by a dif-
ferent mechanism) the same index as the ES, the CME’s S&P 500 future.
The two instruments differ economically in only minor ways, yet for more
than two decades the future (the ES) still consistently led the share (the
SPY), as is conﬁrmed by both interviewees and econometric evidence
(Laughlin, Aguirre, and Grundfest 2014; Budish et al. 2015; Shkilko and
Sokolov 2016).
Why? Why does futures lead, with its idiosyncratic origins in the 1970s
and 1980s, largely persist in today’s world, in which many shares are now
sophisticated, algorithmically constructed ETFs, and in which—as we shall
see below—there are other important classes of ﬁnancial instrument in
which futures do not lead the underlying asset? There are two main expla-
nations, not mutually exclusive. The ﬁrst is that liquidity is path dependent.
If an institutional investor wants to execute a very large trade (e.g., the sale
of 75,000 ES contracts, the equivalent of selling shares worth $4.1 billion,
which triggered the May 2010 “ﬂash crash” in U.S. share prices; see CFTC/1658
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trades, which is still, participants report, the CME’s index futures. In so do-
ing, she or he helps keep that market able to do so and thus helps its prices
to continue to lead those in other markets. The very belief that futures lead
the underlying shares (a belief held by humans, but also, as we saw in the
previous section, programmed into algorithms) further sustains that pattern,
as those algorithms immediately raise share prices when futures prices rise
markedly.
The second explanation of the entrenched nature of futures lead is lever-
age. While ETFs such as the SPY have many of futures’ original advan-
tages—for example, it is reasonably straightforward to use anETF to estab-
lish a short position—it is still easier to achieve high leverage in futures than
in shares (including ETFs). “Futures is ﬁrst, right, because of the leverage it
provides. . . . You’re going to hit the [ES] ﬁrst,” said interviewee AP. Lever-
age is built into the very design of futures contracts, while if you are a small
or medium-sized ﬁrm trading shares, a former high-frequency trader told me
in conversation, achieving high leverage requires you to ﬁnd a broker-dealer
prepared to grant it to you.
This continuing difference between how futures and shares are traded
(even ETF shares, which as noted can be close to economically identical
to share-index futures) has rested at least to some degree on the continuing
split in jurisdiction between the CFTC and SEC. From the 1987 stock mar-
ket crash (which sparked inﬂuential demands to end the split and to har-
monize leverage requirements) to the 2012 Frank-Capuano Bill, which pro-
posed a merger of the CFTC and SEC, all efforts to create a single regulator
have failed. The futures industry has fought, and would most likely again
ﬁght, such a move vigorously: the CME, now the world’s leading exchange
by market value—and one of the most proﬁtable companies in the United
States, with a ratio of operating proﬁt to revenue of 64% (Stafford 2017)—
has continued Melamed’s emphasis on having a strong voice inWashington
(Melamed andTamarkin 1996; Meyer 2015; Stafford 2017). Such a ﬁght has,
however, mostly been unnecessary, because those who favor a CFTC-SEC
merger are often dissuaded by an immediate barrier, which is in effect the
institutionalization of the originally idiosyncratic 1970s hinge. The divide in
the ecologies of ﬁnance (between futures trading and share trading; between
futures exchanges such as theCMEand stock exchanges; between theCFTC
and SEC) is echoed in a divide between congressional committees, especially
Senate committees. Because of futures’ agricultural roots, the CFTC reports
to the Senate Agriculture Committee, the SEC to the Senate Banking Com-
mittee.
“I’ve been in many conversations about the merger of the SEC and
CFTC,” former regulator RF told me. “The conversation quickly stops be-
cause people say, ‘but the [Senate] Ag[riculture] Committee: this [merger]1659
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Allis never going to happen.’” Asked why the SEC and CFTC had never
merged, another former regulator agreed: “You can probably begin and
end your discussion with the Ag Committee. . . . It’s powerful” (interviewee
RG). If the SEC and CFTCmerged, the Agriculture Committee would lose
its jurisdiction over the latter and the regulation of ﬁnancial futures: “that
would then move [to] the jurisdiction of the Senate Banking Committee,”
to which, as just noted, the SEC reports (interviewee RF). Both interview-
ees cited the importance of campaign contributions from the ﬁnance sector
(see ﬁg. 6): “The Senate Ag Committee gets all of this money [contributions].
They’re not going to give up jurisdiction, so you can’t put it [the regulation
of U.S. ﬁnancial markets, currently split between the CFTC and SEC] to-
gether” (interviewee RF).CENTRALIZATION VERSUS THE INTERMARKET TRADING SYSTEM
Just as the process that was to create futures lead was beginning in the mid-
1970s, a separate struggle was taking place over how U.S. shares should be
traded. That conﬂict shaped the overall conﬁguration of the technological
system in which today’s share trading takes place, in particular, the crucial
fact that trading is fragmented among different exchanges in the ﬁve data
centers rather than concentrated in a single exchange in a single data center
(as is the case, e.g., for the trading of ﬁnancial futures). The struggle was
again sparked by a hinge, here between the ﬁelds of politics and of regu-
lation, but one that did not become institutionalized. As a result, the existing
exchanges avoided a proposed centralization of share trading. Instead,
they—especially the NYSE—created an electronically mediated but decen-
tralized network, the Intermarket Trading System, which left existing trad-
ing ﬂoor practices largely intact. Simultaneously, however, the rejection of
centralization created crucial latent preconditions for the second and espe-
cially the third class of HFT signals, fragmentation.
The trigger of the struggle over centralization was the 1960s boom in
U.S. share trading. As volumes rose sharply, the manual processes that un-
derpinned trading—the transfer of money and especially of shares (which
were then still paper certiﬁcates)—became clogged. Piles of unprocessed doc-
uments, delays, omissions, errors (and even theft of share certiﬁcates) accu-
mulated; emergency efforts at computerization were often failures; the “net
effect of all of this was to turn the books and records of many broker-dealers
into a veritable shambles” (SEC 1971b, p. 19). As the boom turned to bust at
the end of the 1960s, stockbrokers began to fail in increasing numbers, threat-
ening to leave hundreds of thousands of clients with large losses: for example,
McDonnell & Company, which collapsed in March 1970, had had nearly
100,000 members of the public among its customers (Welles 1975, p. 172).1660
This content downloaded from 129.215.185.018 on June 14, 2018 07:19:57 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
F
IG
.6
.—
S
ec
to
rs
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
n
g
to
m
em
b
er
s
of
th
e
S
en
at
e
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
,N
u
tr
it
io
n
,a
n
d
F
or
es
tr
y
C
om
m
it
te
e,
20
16
el
ec
ti
on
cy
cl
e.
D
at
a
fr
om
h
tt
p
://
w
w
w
.o
p
en
se
cr
et
s.
or
g,
ac
ce
ss
ed
M
ar
ch
1,
20
17
.
This content downloaded from 129.215.185.018 on June 14, 2018 07:19:57 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
AllThe debacle created a situation (unusual, as noted in the introduction) in
which there were potential political rewards from reforming how shares
were traded. Led by EdMuskie (who “was looking for big issues” on which
to build his run for the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination; Lemov
2011, p. 120), Congress rapidly passed the 1970 Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act, which set up an insurance scheme, funded in part by the federal
government, to compensate the customers of failed brokerages. The act
did not, however, immediately exhaust congressional appetite for reform,
although its leadership passed to less prominent ﬁgures: New Jersey Dem-
ocrat Harrison Williams, who chaired the Securities Subcommittee of the
Senate Banking Committee, and especially California Representative John
Moss, the Democrat who chaired the House Subcommittee on Commerce
and Finance and was building a reputation as a consumer protection advo-
cate. As interviewees RE and RG reported, Williams and Moss each had
aides who had been SEC ofﬁcials. Moss’s aide, former SEC staff attorney
Harvey Rowen, led—with SEC input (interviewee RG)—the drafting of the
resultant legislation, the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (Rowen, n.d.).
This SEC-congressional collaboration formed a hinge between regula-
tion and politics. The 1975 amendments yoked together Congress’s tem-
porary enthusiasm for reform and long-standing SEC concerns about the
extent of the structural advantages enjoyed by some traders and some ex-
changes (especially the NYSE), concerns expressed in two huge multivol-
ume investigations, the Special Study (SEC 1963) and Institutional Investor
Study (SEC 1971a), on the latter of which Moss’s aide Rowen had worked.
The SEC had, nevertheless, done little to act on these concerns: the statute
that established it, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, did not grant it un-
equivocal legal powers to impose a major structural change in how shares
were traded. The 1975 amendments, however, gave the SEC clear authority,
“by rule or order, as it deems necessary in the public interest and for the pro-
tection of investors . . . to remove impediments to and foster the development
of a national market system and national system for the clearance and settle-
ment of securities transactions” (Securities Acts Amendments 1975, p. 139).
Law, though, “has life only to the degree that those in power arewilling to
enliven it” (Danner 2017, p. 4). The political rewards for intervening in how
shares were traded diminished as memories of the late 1960s crisis faded—
Moss, for example, returned to more general consumer protection matters
(Lemov 2011)—weakening the hinge. The SEC was left in the second half
of the 1970s facing, largely on its own, an issue on which it had received no
clear congressional guidance: the material design of the national market
system that Congress had mandated it to create.
One proposed design was to remove barriers to competition and cut costs
by creating a single, centralized, nationwide, electronic order book intowhich
all orders to buy or sell shares had to be entered: the CLOB (consolidated1662
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prominent proponents were Junius Peake, who in the 1960s had led an early
Wall Street computerization drive at broker-dealer Shields & Company,
and Donald Weeden, whose family ﬁrm, Weeden & Company, was promi-
nent in the “third market,” a controversial penumbra of brokerages that—
often in the face of ﬁerce hostility from the NYSE—traded NYSE shares
without going through the Exchange, undercutting the NYSE’s ﬁxed com-
missions (Weeden 2002). Mainstream if not entirely consistent support came
from the nationwide brokerage Merrill Lynch, where (reported interviewee
RH) another former SEC ofﬁcial had a senior advisory role.
In the end, though, the SEC hesitated to back the CLOB. It would have
ended the NYSE’s system of specialists. Each stock traded on the NYSE
had a designated trader who maintained the order book for it and executed
trading ﬂoor or external customers’ bids and offers that matched. These
specialists, however, were also allowed to trade on their own behalf; indeed,
they were obligated to do so if that were necessary to keep a stock trading
continuously (see Abolaﬁa 1996). The SEC was split internally, reports in-
terviewee RF, on the wisdom of introducing a technological system that
would eliminate specialists. Some SEC staff took “the view that [specialists]
were basically rent takers” who exploited their structurally advantageous
position, while others did not want to endanger “the beneﬁts that [special-
ists] did provide” (interviewees RF and RE). There were, in addition, still
hopes in the SEC that the existing regional exchanges in cities such as Phil-
adelphia, Boston, and San Francisco might prove effective rivals to the
NYSE, and a CLOB would end competition of that kind. The CLOB, fur-
thermore, would have been an ambitious technological project, and Presi-
dent Carter’s appointee as SEC chair, HaroldWilliams, was—as interview-
ees told me—ultracautious. In September 1979 testimony before the House
Oversight and Finance Subcommittees, Williams told them, “I am not about
to be the person to come back to Congress and say I am sorry I implemented
your program and it blew [up]” (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions 1980, p. 2).
Three successive ﬁnance-sector committees were set up to advise the
SEC, but their members included both proponents and opponents of the
CLOB, and they therefore could not reach a clear recommendation. When
I told interviewee RE that I had been unable to ﬁnd in the NYSE archives
the minutes of the apparently most important of these committees, the Na-
tional Market Advisory Board, he told me that this did not matter: “They
[the board] were going to argue about a question that had already been de-
cided.”Even if a CLOBwas the best design for the national market system,
and (as just noted) there were doubts in the SEC about that, “it was clear to
us on the [SEC] staff that [the CLOB] just wasn’t going to happen in the
political realm that we were in.” A proposal for a centralized national mar-1663
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Allket system that threatened the very existence of the NYSE (“a very power-
ful institution back then,” according to interviewee RE) and of regional ex-
changes that still had political clout was never going to succeed.
The NYSE itself took the lead in developing the alternative design of the
national market system that was adopted in place of the CLOB: the In-
termarket Trading System or ITS. It was based on an existing NYSE sys-
tem (the Common Message Switch, which connected brokers’ ofﬁces to the
specialists’ trading room booths) and thus could quickly be put into opera-
tion (Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, personal communication). The ITS’s chief
advantage, however, was that it was a compromise solution acceptable to
all except the CLOB’s strongest supporters. It operated in conjunction with
the Consolidated Quotation System, which disseminated the best (i.e., highest-
priced) bids andbest (i.e., lowest-priced) offers on all the exchanges. If a special-
ist on, for example, the Boston Stock Exchange (such as interviewee MG)
was given an order to buy, for instance, “telephone” (AT&T shares), he was
supposed to fulﬁll it himself, whether on his own account or from his order
book, only if therewas no lower offer on another exchange. (Nearly all special-
ists were men; hence the masculine pronoun.) To sell shares on the ﬂoor of the
Boston Stock Exchange at a price higher than, for example, the best offer on
the NYSEwould be a prohibited “trade-through,” and if the NYSE special-
ist detected it, he could demand compensation. Instead, the Boston specialist
was supposed to send a “commitment to trade” message, via the ITS, to the
relevant specialist on the exchange with the cheaper offer, to which the latter
had two minutes (eventually reduced to 30 seconds) to respond.
The ITS, launched in 1978, thus operated at a human pace andwas often
frustrating to use. If, for example, a specialist received a commitment to
trade message seeking to execute against one of his quotes, he could simply
decline to honor the quote, saying if challenged that he was in the process of
changing it (interviewee RG). It thus remained simpler and quicker formost
institutional investors to send large orders directly to the exchange with the
most liquidity, the NYSE, rather than to use regional exchanges and the
ITS. The latter nevertheless offered members of the regional exchanges
something they craved: direct access to the NYSE trading ﬂoor and the ca-
pacity—especially toward the end of a trading day in which they had accu-
mulated a position that they wished to unwind (intervieweeMG)—to strike
dealswith specialists on theNYSEwithout having to pay a commission to an
NYSE broker. The leaders of the regional exchanges therefore backed the
ITS, despite pleas from CLOB advocate Donald Weeden for them not to
do so (Weeden 2002, p. 106).
For the reasons just sketched, the ITS, in place from 1978 to the early
2000s, helped preserve the central role in U.S. share trading of the NYSE’s
trading rooms. Unlike the CLOB’s proposed order book, whichwouldmost
likely have been visible to all participants, the NYSE’s order books (until1664
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remained private to the “specialist” for the stock in question. In practice, a
trading ﬂoor broker could perhaps glance at the book when a specialist or
his clerk was entering his order (SEC 1963, pt. 2, p. 77) or, in later years,FIG. 7.—An NYSE order book from the early 1960s. Source: SEC (1963, pt. 2, p. 491).
The prices are in the traditional eighths of a dollar, and the sizes are in round lots of
100 shares. The names are of the NYSEmember placing the order, most likely on behalf
of an external customer. Orders that are struck through have either been canceled (“cxl”)
or executed against: for example, three orders to sell at $35½ have been matched with
orders to buy at that price; the member ﬁrms responsible for the buy orders are identiﬁed
by a three-letter acronym.1665
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Allglimpse its contents on the display screen in the specialist’s booth. To those
not on the trading ﬂoor, however, the full book was invisible: the NYSE dis-
tributed externally via the Consolidated Quotation System only the price
and aggregate size of the best bid and offer.
Given the extent to which aspects such as this of the status quo of share
trading remained intact, it would be easy to conclude that the early 1970s
congressional-SEC hinge and the resultant reform efforts were simply inef-
fectual. For two reasons, though, that would be wrong. First, although the
SEC was initially very cautious in using the powers granted it by the 1975
Securities Acts Amendments, in the 1990s and 2000s it did intervene more
decisively in how shares were traded, as we shall see in the next section.
Second, the status quo that remained largely unaltered was that of trad-
ing itself. The latter’s underpinnings—the material processes of transfer-
ring the ownership of shares and making the corresponding cash payments
(for which see Millo et al. [2005])—were altered, and very consequentially
so, although the effects of this took 20 years to become evident. The SEC
did implement its 1975 mandate to create a “national system for . . . clear-
ance and settlement,” integrating the exchanges’ (and Nasdaq’s) separate
systems into what was to become a single, centralized system, run by a sin-
gle organization, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. Unlike the
ﬁercely resisted centralization of the glamorous and proﬁtable world of
trading, this reform—of what traders saw as “the dreary task of administer-
ing back ofﬁces” (Seligman 1982, p. 455)—provoked almost no resistance:
back ofﬁces, after all, were where taken-for-granted clerical work, increas-
ingly bywomen, took place.However, like the SEC’s failure to see the value
of having jurisdiction over “pork bellies,” the exchanges’ failure to resist the
centralization of clearingwas consequential. In the late 1990s, the new share
trading venues discussed in the next section did ﬁnally begin to compete ef-
fectively with incumbent exchanges. Clearing and settlement were no bar-
rier to them, since with a single centralized clearing system it was easy to
buy shares on an incumbent venue and sell them on a new venue, or vice
versa. When in the penultimate section we compare the trading of shares
to that of futures or Treasury bonds, we will see just how important that
was. Certainly, the success of the new venueswas to changeU.S. share trad-
ing utterly.HFT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SHARE TRADING
This section sketches how from 1995 onward the fragmentation of U.S.
share trading turned from the latent possibility created by the rejection of
the CLOB to an actuality (and therefore into the source of the third of the
main classes of HFT signal), with most of that trading taking place within1666
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thus provided their algorithms with the second class of HFT signal). That
history is also the history of how HFT moved from being a peripheral ac-
tivity to centrality. Starting in the disreputable margins of the U.S. ﬁnancial
system, a hinge between the ﬁelds of trading and of exchanges came into be-
ing, in which HFT fueled the growth of trading venues that had technolog-
ical systems that facilitated it, while their growth made HFT an ever more
important aspect of the ﬁeld of trading; the changes in those ﬁelds were re-
inforced by the SEC ﬁnally taking decisive action against long-standing
sources of structural advantage within them. (The fourth ﬁeld examined
in this article, politics, was less central to these developments than to those
discussed in the previous two sections.)
The initial locale of the process described in this section was not the trad-
ing of NYSE-listed shares, which continued to be dominated by the NYSE
itself until 2005, but shares listed on Nasdaq. During the 1980s and 1990s,
Nasdaq trading grew, and new high-technology corporations often chose to
list there rather than on theNYSE. Unlike the latter, Nasdaq did not have a
trading ﬂoor, central order books, or specialists. Rather, each Nasdaq stock
had a number of registered market-making ﬁrms (the most popular stocks
had several dozen). Those ﬁrms had a crucial structural advantage. Only
they had what Nasdaq called “level 3” electronic access, allowing them to
post bids and offers on the screens that displayed Nasdaq’s prices. A bro-
ker’s ﬁrm that wanted to buy or to sell at those prices had to telephone a
market maker to request to do so, unless it was acting for a retail customer
(i.e., a member of the general public) who wanted to buy or sell 1,000 shares
or fewer. To save on the costs of handling these small orders manually,
Nasdaq had introduced in 1982 an electronic Small Order Execution Sys-
tem (SOES).
During the 1987 crash, many Nasdaq market makers simply stopped
responding to SOES orders, and in response the SEC ruled that Nasdaq
market makers had to ﬁll orders received via SOES at the prices they were
quoting on Nasdaq’s screens. Freelance professional or semiprofessional
traders—pejoratively dubbed “SOES bandits” by the market makers—
soon realized that this gave them the opportunity to pick off bids or offers
that market-making ﬁrms had not updated quickly enough as market con-
ditions changed. A number of brokerages, often based in run-down build-
ings in lowerManhattan, createdmakeshift trading rooms and offered free-
lance traders access to SOES, either via a trader employed by the brokerage
or by placing an order using a computer keyboard and having it fed auto-
matically into SOES. By the mid-1990s, there were as many as 2,000 SOES
bandits (Harris and Schultz 1998). At least stereotypically—no demographic
data are available—theywere often “city college kids from the backwaters of
Staten Island,Queens, and theBronx, the oneswhodidn’t stand a chance at a1667
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Allbig bank likeGoldman orMorgan” (Patterson 2012, p. 100).Nasdaq’s ofﬁcial
marketmakers loathed SOES bandits, sometimes evenmaking death threats
against them: “They hated us” (interviewee BW). The market makers per-
suaded the SEC to prohibit use of SOESby traders deemed to be “profession-
als,” but a number of such traders contested the ban, and in 1993 it was over-
turned (William Timpinaro et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,
2 F.3d 453 [U.S. Court of Appeals, 1993]).
From the viewpoint of this article, the most important outcome of SOES
banditrywas a new electronic trading venue, Island, set up in 1995 by one of
the “bandit” brokerages, Datek, and designed to help solve amajor problem
faced by bandits. (The account of Island in this and the following seven par-
agraphs is based on interviews with AF, AK, AN, AX, AP, BW, and FA, all
of whomworked for Island, and AB, BD, BT, DA, and DE, who traded on
it. For more detail on Island’s history, see MacKenzie and Pardo Guerra
[2014].) Bandits could use SOES to create a promising trading position,
but unless they were very lucky, they could not use it to liquidate that po-
sition at a proﬁt. To try to do so, they typically had to turn to either Instinet
or SelectNet. Although primitive by today’s standards, they were electronic
systems, but they were also “enemy terrain.”Originally designed for institu-
tional investors to trade directly among themselves, Instinet by the late
1980s had become dominated by Nasdaq market makers, while Nasdaq
had set up SelectNet so that its member ﬁrms, especially its market makers,
could trade electronically with each other without paying fees to Instinet.
Originally, therefore, Island simply provided an electronic platform for
Datek’s bandit customers to trade with each other. Island’s central inspi-
ration, programmer Josh Levine, was, however, both an extremely skilled
coder and something of an “information libertarian,”who—as is clearly ev-
ident in electronic records he made available to me—believed that markets
and other institutions function best if the actors within them have as much
information as possible. Island’s technical system, with Levine responsible
for the design and much of the code of its initial version, had features that
went well beyond the immediate practical needs of SOES bandits. The Is-
landmatching engine executed orders in under twomilliseconds,whichmade
a transaction look instantaneous to human eyes (by comparison, Instinet’s
engines took a couple of seconds; interviewee AF).
Levine, who had earlier designed a computerworkstation,Watcher, used
byDatek’s bandit customers, designed Island for direct computer-to-computer
interaction. (Previous electronic trading systems such as Instinet had been
designed for human use, and automated use of them required clumsy work-
arounds such as “screen scraping”: decoding the stream of binary digits de-
signed to drive a terminal’s visual display.) Levine developed two succinct,
efﬁcient computer protocols that are now widely used in the fastest forms
of automated trading: OUCH, via which bids, offers, and cancellations were1668
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ITCH, which disseminated order book updates, allowing users’ computers
continuously to synthesize their own mirrors of Island’s order book.
Island operated out of Datek’s unprepossessing ofﬁces on Broad Street in
lower Manhattan and was fully automated, with only a handful of staff
needed to run it, at least initially. It was therefore able to charge unprece-
dentedly low fees (a quarter of a cent per share traded) and only for liquidity-
taking orders; Island began the practice (now pervasive in U.S. share trad-
ing, as noted above) of making “rebate” payments—in Island’s case, of a
tenth of a cent per share—to liquidity providers (Biais, Bisière, and Spatt
2003, p. 6). Crucially, too, Island’s price grid was ﬁner than Nasdaq’s. In
the mid-1990s, the minimum price increment on Nasdaq (and also, e.g., the
NYSE) was an eighth of a dollar, and in practice a tacit agreement among
Nasdaq’s ofﬁcial market makers to avoid quoting prices in odd eighths of
dollars had usually kept the “spread” between the highest bid and lowest offer
as big as 25 cents (Christie and Schultz 1994). Island’s minimum price incre-
ment was 1/256th of a dollar, meaning that it was possible for HFT ﬁrms to
provide liquidity on Island at pricesmarginally better than those ofNasdaq’s
ofﬁcial market makers and still earn very healthy proﬁts.
When Island began operating in 1995, there were only a handful of ﬁrms
worldwide engaged in anything analogous to today’s HFT. Prior to Island,
the “ﬁt” between the material practices of these nascent HFT ﬁrms and
those of existing exchanges was poor (MacKenzie 2017). In particular, au-
tomated market making (in which, as described above, a ﬁrm’s algorithms
continuously keep keenly priced offers and slightly lower-priced bids in the
order book, constantly changing their prices as market conditions shift) was
frustratingly difﬁcult on theNYSE, as interviewee BD reported. As already
described, the NYSE’s order books were private to its specialists, and
NYSE trade executions were not automated: a specialist had to authorize
them, usually by pressing “enter” on his computer terminal. Acknowledg-
ment of cancellations of orders—crucial to preventing a market-making al-
gorithm from being picked off—was often delayed for several potentially
vital seconds. In addition, the NYSE’s fees were high, and even with the
late 1990s reduction in the minimum price increment to a sixteenth of a dol-
lar, it was expensive to undercut incumbents’ prices.
The technological and economic ﬁt between HFT and Island was much
closer: the ﬁrst clear manifestation of the hinge referred to at the start of this
section. As interviewee AB put it, Island had the “ﬁrst really efﬁcient and
scalable cash equities [i.e., shares] matching engine”: cancellations and ex-
ecutions were entirely automated and close to instantaneous. As already
noted, Island’s fees were low, it paid rebates to market makers, and it
had a very small minimumprice increment. Theway inwhich each individ-
ual update to Island’s book was disseminated via the ITCH data feed1669
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Allmeant that a market-making algorithm could keep constant track of where
exactly in the book its orders were and how close they were to execution.
Culturally, too, the ﬁt was close: the young tech-savvy men (again, they
were nearly all men) who ran Island were similar to those who staffed the
nascent HFT ﬁrms; indeed, staff circulated between Island and those ﬁrms.
Island prospered in good part because it attracted HFT, while HFT
gained shape and gathered initial momentum in trading on Island. (Among
theHFTpractices introduced on Islandwas colocation, with Island encour-
aging trading ﬁrms to place their servers in its Broad Street building, even
in the same room as Island’s servers.) When Island was set up in 1995, only
the ﬁrst of the three classes of HFT signal analyzed in this article (futures
lead) was fully available to HFT algorithms: Island’s order book was visi-
ble to them, but it initially formed only a small portion of the market for
Nasdaq shares; and there was as yet only limited fragmentation. Futures
lead, however, was enough to make HFT on Island highly proﬁtable. In
particular, in the late 1990s the CME began to trade a new index future, the
“NQ,” which tracks the Nasdaq-100 index of shares. Changes in the market
for the NQwere a hugely useful signal for trading Nasdaq shares, and espe-
cially for market making on Island in the QQQ, an exchange-traded fund,
very popular in the dot.com years, that also tracks the Nasdaq-100.
Proﬁts earned on Island helped the new HFT ﬁrms to grow, providing
capital that enabled them to expand into other markets. Simultaneously,
the liquidity they provided helped Island attract ever-larger proportions
of the trading of Nasdaq-listed shares. Island’s success quickly attracted
competing venues with similar “HFT-friendly” features, such as Chicago-
based Archipelago; the new trading venues were christened electronic com-
munications networks or ECNs. Year on year, their share of the trading of
Nasdaq-listed shares rose inexorably. By March 2000, ECNs had captured
26% of Nasdaq dollar volume; just over a year later (June 2001), that had
risen to 37% (Biais et al. 2003, p. 6).
Under its Clinton-appointed chair, Arthur Levitt, the SEC began to use
powers granted it by the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments to reduce struc-
tural advantages that inhibited competition in share trading. The revelation
by the ﬁnancial economists William Christie and Paul Schultz (1994) that
Nasdaq’s ofﬁcial market makers tacitly collaborated to keep “spreads”
proﬁtably wide sparked nationwide negative publicity, and the emergence
of the ECNs gave the SEC a straightforward way of reducing those market
makers’ structural advantage: it forced them to display ECN prices when
they were better than their own (that was the gist of the SEC’s Order Han-
dling Rules, which came into force in 1997). The SEC’s 1998 Regulation Al-
ternative Trading Systems made it easier to set up ECNs (Castelle et al.
2016), and the SEC also moved U.S. share trading as a whole some of the
way toward Island’s ﬁne price grid, in 2000–2001 reducing the minimum1670
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a process that market participants called “decimalization.”
TheNYSE, though, remained protected from the ECNs by the slow ITS.
In 2005, however, SEC chair Arthur Donaldson (although a Republican
appointed by George W. Bush) broke with his two fellow Republican com-
missioners and voted with the two Democrats to enact Regulation National
Market System (Reg NMS), the current framework governing U.S. share
trading (SEC 2005). The Reg NMS stripped the NYSE trading ﬂoor of the
protection of the ITS: if a price quotation was available only from a human
being on a trading ﬂoor, it was no longer “protected,” and electronic trading
no longer needed to pause while an order was routed to that human being.
Just as the ECNs ate into Nasdaq’s share of the trading of Nasdaq-listed
stocks, soRegNMS triggered an evenmore dramatic collapse of theNYSE’s
share of NYSE-listed stocks. In the ﬁve years from 2005, that share fell from
80% to just over 20% (Angel, Harris, and Spatt 2013, p. 20, ﬁg. 2.17). Nasdaq
and theNYSE reacted by buying themost threateningECNs. Island’s owner,
Datek, had sold it to Mitt Romney’s Bain Capital in 2000, which then sold
it on to Instinet. By buying Instinet’s U.S. business in 2005, Nasdaq thus
acquired Island (including the ultrafast matching engine technology that
hadmade it so dangerous a rival), while theNYSEbought Archipelago, also
in 2005.11
In both cases, though, part of the point of the acquisition was to help the
acquirer transform itself materially so as to become more like the ECN it
had bought (a process described by interviewees AF, AK, AP, FA, and
FB). Nasdaq had already abandoned its traditional telephone-mediated of-
ﬁcial market-maker way of working in favor of an electronic order book vis-
ible to all participants.WhenNasdaqbought Island, Iwas told by interviewee
AK, it reengineered its systems around Levine’s ITCH and OUCH protocols
and an updated version of his ultrafast matching engine. “Island technology
runs global equities [share trading] at the moment,” said AP in 2012. The
NYSE, similarly, in 2002 had made its order books visible to those not on
the trading ﬂoor (albeit initially with updates only every 10 seconds). When
the NYSE acquired Archipelago, it drew on the latter’s technology to rede-
sign its systems (interviewee FB). HFT was facilitated by these redesigns,
and HFT ﬁrms that previously had experienced Nasdaq and the NYSE
as unhelpful or even hostile also began to feel courted (interviewee BT).
Decimalization, Reg NMS, and the earlier SEC rulings helpful to the
ECNs provided a favorable context for this shift. Those moves by the SEC11 Archipelago was renamed NYSE-Arca. Its share of the trading of NYSE-listed stocks
alleviated, but did not fully compensate for, the decline in NYSE’s share (Angel et al.
2013, p. 20, ﬁg. 2.17).
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Allcan be seen as its taking advantage of the emergence of successful rivals to
incumbent exchanges to further its long-standing mandate to enhance com-
petition, in a situation in which the balance of forces in the ﬁelds of trading
and exchangeswas farmore favorable than in the 1970s. (As interviewee RF
puts it, “the ability of the [Securities andExchange]Commission tomove for-
ward on major issues really does require . . . at least some segment of the [ﬁ-
nance] industry to be supportive.” That segment was too slender at the time
of the CLOB controversy; by the late 1990s it was much larger.) The crucial
continuing hinge is, however, directly material links between the ﬁelds of
trading and of exchanges, in which the latter—in their ﬁerce competition
for market share—have to provide the technological features (colocation, ul-
trafastmatching engines, etc.) that facilitateHFT,whileHFT ﬁrms’ trading
makes the exchanges thatmost successfully do this attractively liquid venues
on which to trade.
While Nasdaq’s 2005 acquisition of Island, and the NYSE’s of Archipel-
ago, removed two crucial rivals to the incumbent trading venues, other
ECNs remained, keeping competition for market share alive. Most impor-
tant in this respect was a new ECN set up in 2005: BATS (Better Alterna-
tive Trading System). It represented a particularly close form of the hinge
between the ecologies of trading and exchanges: BATSwas set up by a team
from the Kansas City HFT ﬁrm, Tradebot, with capital supplied in part by
another leading HFT ﬁrm and two brokerages that specialize in catering to
HFT. Like Island a decade earlier, BATS offered lower fees and fast tech-
nology (the latter rivaling even Nasdaq’s Island-inspired new system). In-
terviewee EZ reports constant pressure within BATS to speed up its match-
ing engines: “it’s . . .Board presentations, quarterly, in terms of how fast the
matching engine [is]. Have we cracked the 200 microsecond [barrier]?”
Island led to an informal alliance between a trading venue and HFT;
BATS embodied such an alliance in its very creation. However, a hinge,
in the sense of Abbott (2005), is not necessarily an alliance, but—as already
noted—a process that brings rewards inmore than one ecology. There is, for
example, no evidence that the SEC intended with 2005’s Reg NMS or with
its earliermeasures to facilitate high-frequency trading.Norwas the SEC in
any straightforward sense a supporter of Island, which carried in some eyes
an element of stigma (“Those guys are a bunch of crooks”: interviewee BD)
from its bandit origins.
Similarly, Island was set up not to promote HFT (which scarcely existed
in 1995), but primarily to facilitate bandits’manual trading. I could, for ex-
ample, ﬁnd no evidence in Levine’s documents that hismatching-engine de-
sign—which gave Island its blistering speed by clever use of “cache” (the
limited-capacity but ultrafast memory that is physically part of a processor
chip), not slower main memory—had HFT in mind. Rather, it was a pro-
grammer’s aesthetic, so to speak: an elegantly efﬁcient use of computational1672
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make changes in the material organization of trading that rendered redun-
dant much of what their specialists, brokers, and market makers did. But,
eventually, they simply had to transform themselves to resemblemore closely
their newHFT-friendly rivals or suffer evenmore catastrophic loss ofmarket
share. No one clearly foresaw or planned to create the current sociomaterial
arrangements of U.S. share trading. Rather, these arrangements emerged,
and the hinge between the ﬁelds of trading and of exchanges (extending, at
least partially, to the ﬁeld of regulation) was central to their emergence.HFT IN OTHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
The reader may, nevertheless, worry that how U.S. shares are traded, and
the signals that this generates for HFT, might simply be intrinsic to the au-
tomation of trading. This section demonstrates that this is not so, by exam-
ining brieﬂy the automated trading of three other classes of ﬁnancial instru-
ment that, like shares, are simple, standardized, and highly liquid: futures,
benchmark U.S. Treasurys, and “spot” foreign exchange. (Some HFT ﬁrms
also trade options and interest rate swaps, but the greater complexity of
those products makes them less directly comparable to shares.) Any full
treatment is impossible here: this section simply sketches the most impor-
tant differences between the three markets and share trading, especially
in the signals available for HFT (summarized in table 4).TABLE 4
The Availability of the Three Classes of Signal in HFT Markets
SIGNALS
HFT MARKETS Futures Lead Order Book Dynamics Fragmentation
Shares Yes Yes, with partial
exception of
“dark pools”
Yes
Futures Not applicable Yes No
Benchmark
Treasurys
Varies through
time
Yes, but many venues
have no order books
Yes, but HFTs still excluded
from many venues,
so limited exploitability
Spot foreign
exchange
No Yes, but many venues
have no order books
Yes, but last look and other
measures often prevent its
exploitation by HFTsThi
All use subject to Uns content download
iversity of Chicagoed from 129.215.185.018 o
 Press Terms and ConditioNOTE.—The availability of the three classes of signal on which this article focuses in the
main markets in which HFT ﬁrms are active. Source of information is interviewees. A “dark
pool” is a trading venue in which the order book is not visible to participants (although its con-
tents can sometimes be inferred by “pinging”: repeatedly entering small orders).1673
n June 14, 2018 07:19:57 AM
ns (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
AllFutures: No Fragmentation
By far the sharpest contrast between U.S. share trading and futures trading
is that, via the process just described, the former has become fragmented
across multiple trading venues (and that fragmentation is the source of a
crucial class of signal), while almost all ﬁnancial futures trading takes place
on a single venue, the ChicagoMercantile Exchange. Its market share of all
U.S. futures trading in 2015 was 89%, and it is unequivocally dominant in
ﬁnancial futures, hosting, for example, 99.97% of the trading of interest rate
futures and options on these futures (Meyer 2015).
Since futures usually “lead” their underlying assets (with the important
exceptions mentioned below), that leaves available only one of the three
classes of HFT signals on which I have focused, order book dynamics: “fu-
tures in general . . . in the most actively traded products, it’s all order book
dynamics, regardless of what it is you’re trading,” says interviewee AC.
Certainly, HFT interviewees from the futures market seemed focused far
more exclusively on the order book than their colleagues in shares were.
Spooﬁng—the entire rationale of which is to “fool” algorithms that make
predictions based on the order book—also seemed far more salient to them.
In addition, the absence of fragmentation (and the resultant huge single
pools of liquidity) in share-index futures trading—the most important such
futures, in particular the ES and NQ, are traded only on the CME—may
help explain the remarkable longevity of futures lead in share trading.
Why fragmentation in shares and effectively a single exchange in ﬁnancial
futures?Essentially, the conditions that led to the former have been absent in
the latter. With no equivalent congressional push for structural reform be-
hind the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act, and those al-
lied to existing futures exchanges inﬂuencing their drafting, the amendments
did not mandate a uniﬁed futures clearing and settlement system (which the
1975 Securities Acts Amendments mandated for shares), making it very
much harder for new futures venues to challenge incumbents. Nor did the
1974 amendments grant the new futures regulator, the CFTC, the powers
to intervene in market structure that the 1975 legislation gave the SEC. In
addition, while the SEC is a permanent federal body, the CFTC is depen-
dent on periodic congressional reauthorization,withoutwhich (as at the time
of writing) it is reliant on year-to-year funding. That, as interviewee RE sug-
gested, leaves the CFTCmuch less able than the SEC to pursue policies that
might generate strong ﬁnance industry opposition.
Benchmark Treasurys: Powerful Incumbents, a Bifurcated Market
While U.S. ﬁnancial futures trading is dominated by a single exchange,
Treasurys’ trading was—and to a considerable extent still is—dominated
by powerful dealers, especially those ofﬁcially designated by the U.S. De-1674
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even for the “benchmark” (most actively traded) Treasurys, which are among
theworld’s most liquid securities—is split into two separate segments: one (to
which, for idiosyncratic reasons that cannot be examined here, HFT ﬁrms
have had access since the early 2000s) in which dealers trade with each other
and a second segment (fromwhichHFT is still almost completely excluded) in
which dealers trade with their “customers,” such as big institutional investors.
Efforts to create for Treasurys trading venues, akin to Island, without
ﬁxed “dealer”/“customer” distinctions—venues of the kind now pervasive
in shares—have so far failed. Interviewees reported ﬁerce dealer opposition
to such venues, and the SEC has not intervened. It is a much weaker pres-
ence in Treasurys than in shares. (The ultimate structural difference is
that while in most ﬁnancial markets government agencies are present as
regulators, in Treasurys the federal government is itself a market partici-
pant, indeed the most important such participant.) Treasurys are exempt
from much of the legal framework (e.g., the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
and 1975 Securities Acts Amendments) that governs securities trading and
gives the SEC its authority. The SEC has to share its limited jurisdiction
over the trading of Treasurys with the Department of the Treasury itself
and itsmarket agent, the Federal Reserve Bank ofNewYork, both of which
have seemed content with the status quo (at least until very recently, as con-
cerns about liquidity have emerged). “It’s very hard,” says a former SEC of-
ﬁcial, for the SEC to act “withTreasuryDepartment opposition” (interviewee
RF). Among the consequences of split regulation is, for example, thatwho has
responsibility for acting against spooﬁng in Treasurys has been unclear:12 Br
to af
All uAuthor: Who do you go to in the cash bonds [to report spooﬁng]?
Interviewee BM: The cash you go to no one. No one really covers it.The fragmentation in the trading of Treasurys is largely not exploitable
by high-frequency traders because of their effective exclusion from all but
the two main electronic platforms on which dealers trade with each other.
Furthermore, the remaining platforms are dealer-customer markets, which
mostly do not have central order books with ﬁrm bids and offers: rather,
trades are initiated by customers sending dealers electronic requests to quote
prices to them. Nor is there a straightforward pattern of futures lead: there
are periods, interviewees reported, in which the underlying Treasurys lead
bond futures rather than vice versa. The most plausible explanation is that
very high levels of leverage are possible in Treasurys, because of the long-
standing institution of “repo,” in which Treasurys are pledged as collateral
to guarantee loans to buy them.12andt, Kavajecz, and Underwood (2007) ﬁnd that the cost of repo ﬁnancing seems
fect whether the bond futures market leads the Treasurys market or vice versa.
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AllAmong the factors that have preserved the traditional dealer/customer
divide and a bifurcated market in Treasurys is again clearing and settle-
ment. The electronic venues on which Treasurys are traded are not fully
ﬂedged exchanges: in the terminology of ﬁnancial markets, most trading
of Treasurys is “over the counter,” directly between ﬁrms. The largest such
ﬁrms, including the incumbent Primary Dealer banks, are members of the
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC), but smaller market participants
such asHFT ﬁrms lack the capital to gainmembership of the FICC. Trading
venues can face sudden intraday demands from the FICC for multimillion-
dollar margin deposits when a bank that is an FICC member trades with
an HFT ﬁrm that is not. This difﬁculty proved fatal for a 2015–16 attempt
(described by interviewee GF) to create an Island-style venue (open to “deal-
ers,” “customers,” andHFT ﬁrms), which had to be scrappedwhen the FICC
member bank through which it was going to clear pulled out of the project.Foreign Exchange: “How Is That Legal?”
Similar difﬁculties have also kept HFT in a relatively weak position in for-
eign exchange. It too is an over-the-counter market with powerful incum-
bents. There is an international settlement system, Continuous Linked Set-
tlement, but it does not eliminate all risk of default, so the creditworthiness
of the other party to a trade is a pervasive issue in foreign exchange. To op-
erate on any scale in the foreign exchange market, an HFT ﬁrm therefore
requires the sponsorship of a well-capitalized major bank, and successful
trading venues have also needed bank involvement. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, several Island-style trading venues were launched, but all ei-
ther failed or discovered that they had to “befriend . . . the banks . . . and
workwith them” rather than try “to force the banks into the new paradigm”
(interviewee EN).
Even the weak regulation found in Treasurys has been largely absent: in
aworld inwhich, theEuropeanUnion aside,ﬁnancial regulation is stillmainly
national in scope, foreign exchange, an inherently international market, has
no regulator with clear authority over it. That has allowed market practices
to emerge that have no surviving analogues in shares or futures, in particular
“last look,” in which a trading venue’s matching engines give the servers of a
ﬁrm granted last look privileges “anywhere from ﬁve to ten milliseconds, up
to a few hundred milliseconds, sometimes up to a few seconds” (interviewee
AT) before consummating a trade. Last look protects market makers, espe-
cially banks (whose computer systems are often slow by HFT standards),
from having their stale quotes picked off. Interviewee BB, with a back-
ground in the trading of shares and futures, reports being incredulous when
he ﬁrst encountered last look: “How is that legal?”1676
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taking foreign-exchange strategies infeasible: for example, “[triangular arbi-
trage] doesn’t work, because of last look,” says interviewee AY.13 HFT ﬁrms
that make foreign-exchange proﬁts at the expense of powerful incumbents
can also ﬁnd themselves simply expelled from trading venues: “I got turned
off in two days’ time because they said we were too predatory” (interviewee
BK). The combined result of last look and expulsions, reports FN, has been
a sharp decline in the activity ofHFT taking algorithms in foreign exchange,
a shift also noted by Moore, Schrimpf, and Sushko (2016).
The signals available for HFT in foreign exchange also differ from those
in HFT in shares (see table 4). The spot markets in foreign exchange—in
which very high levels of leverage are available—generally lead the futures
market, interviewees reported, with the effect that signals fromChicago are
less crucial. (For example, HFT interviewee BB’s ﬁrm decided not to pay
for the ultraexpensive highest-speed Spread Networks link from Chicago,
but only the cheaper Spread service in which strands of cable are coiled
to slow transmission by around amillisecond.) Most foreign-exchange trad-
ing venues do not have central order books; they rely instead on continuous
streams of quotations frommarket makers, especially big banks, with other
market participants relegated to the role of “price takers.” With multiple,
competing trading venues, there are useful fragmentation signals, but the
combination of last look, expulsions, and technical devices that slow trading
down limits the ways in which those signals can be exploited.CONCLUSION
The comparison of the trading of shares with that of other ﬁnancial instru-
ments reinforces this article’s central ﬁnding. For all the high-tech glamor of
autonomous, algorithmic economic agents, their behavior is—to repeat
Martin’s apposite phrase—“saturated with history” (2003, p. 44). The “sig-
nals” that inform howHFT algorithms trading U.S. shares act and interact
are not inherent in the very process of the automation of trading. Three of
the four main classes of HFT signal in share trading are the result of con-
ﬂicts with strong meso-level political economy aspects (conﬂicts that also,
e.g., left consequential legal legacies). There are important differences in
the signals available to HFT algorithms trading ﬁnancial instruments other
than shares, differences that are related to the different political economies
of thosemarkets. In the briefest of summaries, howHFTalgorithms act and
interact is a speciﬁc, contingent product of the interaction of people, orga-13 Triangular arbitrage is the exploitation of ﬂeetingly inconsistent patterns of prices in
which, e.g., it is proﬁtable to exchange dollars for yen, yen for euros, and then euros back
into dollars.
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past interaction.14
Most likely, the three classes of signal on which I have focused inform the
actions of at least one of the parties to the majority of transactions in U.S.
shares.15 To the extent that this is so, what we have found conﬁrms, for ex-
ample, Krippner’s argument that “congealed into every market exchange
is a history of struggle and contestation” (2001, p. 785). We have, however,
also discovered the importance of what was not struggled over: in particu-
lar, the unglamorous activities of clearing and settlement, the “dreary” but
deeply consequential material process that underpins ﬁnancial trading.
Furthermore, among the forms of “congealment” revealed here is a crucial
mechanism to which economic sociology has not given enough attention:
theway inwhich the outcomes of struggles can condense intomaterial form,
into the features of technological systems. Futures lead, order book dynam-
ics, and fragmentation involve issues of law and of political economy, but
they are now also material: “hardwired” into the huge, tightly coupled tech-
nological system that U.S. share trading has become.
This article therefore suggests that the sociological analysis of HFT—
and, perhaps more generally, of today’s algorithmic economic life16—re-
quires integrating the materialism of actor-network theory (and of the soci-
ology of technology more widely) with economic sociology’s, particularly
ﬁeld-theoretic economic sociology’s, sensitivity to conﬂict and to matters
of political economy, structural advantage, the law, and government. Con-
sider, for example, the sharpest recent conﬂict concerning how U.S. shares
should be traded, which took place in 2015–16. Its focus was a 60-kilometer
coil of ﬁber-optic cable installed by the new stock exchange, the Investors
Exchange (IEX), in the NY4 data center. All orders to IEX and market
data from IEX have to pass through the coil, delaying them by 350 micro-
seconds. It wasﬁercely, albeit eventually unsuccessfully, argued that IEX’s in-
stallation of the coil should deny IEX orders Reg NMS protection from trade-14 I am extremely grateful to one of AJS’s referees for remarks that led me to the formu-
lation in this sentence.
15 With an HFT share of trading of around 50%, it is probable that in the majority of
transactions at least one party is an HFT algorithm (since of course there are two parties
to each transaction). Furthermore, as interviewee DH told me, many execution algo-
rithms also now use the same classes of signal as HFT algorithms.
16 Space constraints prevent discussion of the generalizability of this article’s ﬁndings.
Let me, however, brieﬂy say that when algorithms interact primarily with slow human
beings (as they do, e.g., in search, in recommendation systems, and in much e-commerce),
the speciﬁcally Einsteinianmateriality discussed here is less evident. Increasingly, though,
direct algorithm-to-algorithm economic interaction is becoming more prevalent, and I
would anticipate Einsteinian features emerging in other areas in which that interaction
takes a form in which speed gives an advantage.
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Material Signalsthroughs and indeed should prevent the SEC registering IEX as an exchange.
Both law and political economy were condensed into that conﬂict (ultimately,
it touched onwhat the purposes of share trading should be), but at its core was
IEX’s creation of a material device that deliberately reconﬁgured at least a
small part of the technological system of U.S. share trading (a system that, this
article has argued, has emerged rather than having been consciously de-
signed).17
Had space permitted, much more could have been said about the inﬂu-
ences on the interaction of HFT algorithms trading U.S. shares. The article
has focused on the “signals” employed by these algorithms, which are af-
fordances; it has said little about the constraints on how algorithms can act.
A similar analysis of those constraints would, however, be possible. They
too are both material and the results of struggle, in some cases the same
struggles as analyzed above. In the case of U.S. share trading, for example,
themost immediate constraints areRegNMS’s order protection rules,which,
inter alia, inherit the Intermarket Trading System’s ban on trade-throughs.
The rules of Reg NMS are also now hardwired into exchanges’ and dark
pools’matching engines; they have given rise to a staggering variety of types
of electronic order—no longer just simple bids and offers—that exchanges
make available to help HFT ﬁrms make markets proﬁtably within the con-
straints of these rules.18 Materially, Reg NMS is Newtonian, so to speak: the
rules that constrain today’s U.S. share trading are formulated in terms of the
best currently available price nationally, when in the Einsteinian materiality
of speed-of-light signaling and microsecond response times that current best
price depends on something not evenmentioned inRegNMS, an algorithm’s
precise spatial location.
Other aspects of my treatment of how algorithms interact have also had
to be very brief. In particular, there has not been space to explore in any
depth the divide in HFT between “making” and “taking,” a divide that is
simultaneously material/cognitive and cultural/legitimatory. The article has17 Readers of Lewis’s Flash Boys (2014) might form the impression that IEX is anti-
HFT, but that is not so. As interviewees told me, HFT market makers are welcome
and active on IEX. The chief point of the coil is to make it impossible to proﬁt from
the sixth class of signal listed in table 1, in which orders are being matched at the mid-
point of the highest bid and lowest offer, but the prices being used to calculate that mid-
point are stale (much trading on IEX takes the form of midpoint matching). The data
feeds from the other exchanges that IEX uses to calculate the midpoint of the national
best bid and offer do not go through the coil (and thus are not delayed), but orders to
IEX are delayed. By the time an order attempting to exploit a stale midpoint would ar-
rive at IEX, the prices used to calculate the midpoint would thus already have been up-
dated.
18 Mackintosh (2014) counts 133 distinct types of order offered by U.S. stock exchanges,
but these can often be combined together, creating a much larger universe of composite
orders.
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shares and has said nothing aboutHFToutside of theUnited States. AsHFT
diffused from U.S. share trading to those other instruments, and from the
United States toEurope, Asia, andLatinAmerica, it has acted somewhat like
a tracer dye: it has ﬂowed easily into some markets, into only speciﬁc sectors
of others, and not at all into others yet again.
Although the making/taking divide and the wider ﬂow of HFT’s tracer
dye must be left for future publications, the overall form that the analysis
of them must take is now clear. The algorithmic practices of HFT, how
those practices are adapted to different markets, how they alter those mar-
kets, and whether or not they are successful—all of these are the result not
simply of HFT’s technological characteristics, but of how those character-
istics interweave with the episodes of cooperation and conﬂict that give
markets their form. Those episodes have always involved human beings,
and they still do. It is, however, becoming ever more evident that at their
core are relations not just among those humans, but also among algorithms
and among machines.REFERENCES
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